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Abstract
This paper asks whether or not it is possible to induce agents to good behavior per-
manently via regulators’ reputations and attain perpetual social efficiency. We propose
and analyze a repeated incomplete information game with a specific payoff and mon-
itoring structure between a regulator possessing a behavioral type and an agent. We
provide an affirmative answer when a patient regulator faces myopic agents: Reputation
empowers the regulator to prevent agents’ bad behavior in the long-run with no cost and
hence to attain the social optimum in any Nash equilibrium. However, with long-lived
and patient players, reputation cannot induce permanent good behavior in equilibrium
involving sporadic experimentation with bad behavior. The stark contrast between these
cases portrays the significance of the longevity of the interaction and provides a novel
application of the theory of learning and experimentation in repeated games.
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1 Introduction
The misbehavior of an agent facing a regulator who spends costly time and resources to
audit/investigate is frequently observed. Examples include an investor engaged in fraud by
misrepresenting his books to a certified auditor; a bank misreporting the information about
its financial health to a regulator; a taxpayer filing false income statements to a tax authority;
a construction or mine company neglecting work safety precautions and misreporting its prac-
tices; an employee not exerting the promised effort in a business owned by a principal, etc.
The instances of financial fraud, corporate deceptions, and work accidents often involve these
kinds of misbehavior which are frequently related to the corresponding regulator’s reputation
for being diligent or lack of it.1 Indeed, reputation concerns of regulators may prevent or
lessen the extent and severity of such socially undesirable outcomes and behavior.2
Motivated by instances of “bad” behavior frequently emerging in regulated and repeated
environments, this paper aims to unravel whether or not regulators’ reputation can induce
the “good” behavior permanently when the repeated interaction is neither observable nor
contractable. We analyze a dynamic environment where the regulator (he) is responsible to
detect deviations from the good behavior via costly auditing yet may not be diligent in doing
so because of the associated costs. We propose a dynamic incomplete information game with a
stage game possessing a particular payoff and signaling structure played between a long-lived
regulator (who could be committed to being diligent or is strategic) and an agent (she).
First, we show that when the patient long-lived regulator faces a sequence of myopic
agents who play only once but observe the public history of past play, reputation empowers
1For instance, Bernard Madoff was found guilty to several offenses including fraud and making false state-
ments with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). He began the Ponzi scheme in the early 1990s, yet
he was arrested in late 2008 even though the SEC had previously conducted several investigations since 1992.
SEC has been criticized for failing to act on Madoff fraud. The SEC inspector confessed: “Despite several
examinations and investigations being conducted, a thorough and competent investigation or examination was
never performed” (see “SEC criticized for failing to act on Madoff” at http://business.timesonline.co.uk by
Seib and “Madoff Explains How He Concealed the Fraud” at www.cbsnews.com). Yet in another investment
fraud charge, against Robert Allen Stanford in 2009, a report of the investigation by the SEC Office of the
Inspector General shows that the agency has been following Stanford’s companies for much longer and reveals
lack of diligence in the SEC enforcement (see http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/oig-526.pdf ).
2The negligence of regulation may be associated with serious casualties. There was a mine accident that
took place in Soma, Turkey, which caused a loss of 301 lives in 2014. In response to a parliamentary question,
The General Directorate of Mining Affairs of Turkey (GDMA) told that they could only afford to audit less
than one-fourth of all the minefields annually. Meanwhile, many established NGOs (e.g., The Union of Turkish
Bar Associations and The Union of Turkish Engineering and Architecture Associations) announced doubts and
concerns about GDMA’s governance practices in conjunction with this accident. In fact, during the criminal
case associated with this accident, it became public information that an auditor of GDMA responsible for that
particular mine was also employed by the company owning that mine as a technical supervisor (see Turkish
newspaper page at https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/somada-denetci-skandali-29868799 ).
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the regulator to prevent agents’ bad behavior by inducing them to behave (well) in the long-
run with no cost (and hence attain the maximum payoff which coincides with the social
optimum) in any Nash equilibrium. To address situations with large populations of many long-
lived agents who are not able to coordinate on future behavior, rewards, and punishments,
we consider the Markovian setting with a single myopic (representative) agent.3 We show
that there exists a unique Markov equilibrium with a value function that is continuous and
nondecreasing in the reputation for being diligent. The regulator’s value function attains
the maximum payoff at the absorbing reputation levels (Markov states) at which the agents
exhibit good behavior while the regulator incurs no cost. These findings are robust in the
sense that requiring each agent to choose any of her actions with an arbitrarily small but
positive probability does not alter these results qualitatively.
However, when the regulator faces the same long-lived agent, we show that permanency
of good behavior cannot be a robust equilibrium outcome with sufficiently patient players:
we prove that, regardless of the initial beliefs, there is no Nash equilibrium in which the
agent behaves (well) on average in the long-run on a positive probability set of histories while
experimenting with the bad behavior every once in a while.4
Hence, our findings display a stark contrast between the myopic agents’ case and the
case with a long-lived skeptical agent who cannot refrain from (costly) testing the regulator’s
reputation (no matter how high it is) by behaving badly now and then. Therefore, the current
paper contributes to the theory of reputation by portraying the significance of the longevity
of the interaction among the participants and providing a novel application of the theory
of learning and experimentation in repeated games: In our setting, agent’s good behavior
corresponds to the absorbing case (because then no additional information could emerge and
require updating of beliefs), while the strategic regulator would exploit this by refraining from
costly auditing (thereby, sustaining efficiency); thus, the problem boils down to discouraging
experimentation in the case of perpetual interaction among the participants.5
The repeated game between the regulator and the agent(s) involves unobservable actions
3There are many such cases (e.g., a population of taxpayers facing a tax authority) where the dismissal
of intertemporal coordination among agents is plausible. Under some additional restrictions known in the
literature, the resulting situation parallels with the Markovian case involving a myopic representative agent.
4To ensure that the agent experiments with the bad behavior occasionally, we discuss a setting where she
suffers one-period amnesia with some small but positive probability in every period (in which case she hangs
on to her sufficiently low initial beliefs that the regulator is tough). Moreover, perfection of Selten (1975)
implies our notion of robustness as well. Sadly it is too powerful: the regulator (the informed player) would
be enforced to choose each of his actions with some arbitrarily small but positive probability as well. Besides,
it creates non-trivial complications. Meanwhile, the ant colony optimization (ACO) techniques of computer
science pioneered by Dorigo (1992) parallel with our robustness notion.
5We thank an anonymous referee for elegantly outlining and helping us to summarize these observations.
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on both sides and incomplete information about the regulator’s type. The agent’s actions
consist of good behavior and bad behavior and the regulator’s of firm and lax actions. The
behavioral type of the regulator is committed to playing the firm action. The good behavior
by the agent generates a good public signal regardless of the regulator’s choice. However, if
the agent has chosen to behave badly, the regulator can detect the misbehavior with some
probability (which determines the audit quality) only if he has chosen the costly firm action.
The stage game payoffs are so that the agent’s best response to believing that the regulator
will be diligent (i.e., firm) is to be truthful (the good behavior), whereas it is to be untruthful
(the bad behavior) if the agent believes the regulator will be lazy (lax). Meanwhile, the
regulator’s best response is to be lazy when the agent is truthful and to be diligent if the
agent is expected to be untruthful. The regulator prefers that the agent is truthful (regulator-
preferred action) and the agent prefers that the regulator is lazy (agent-preferred action). The
regulator’s reputation determines the agent’s belief about the regulator’s type and choices.
If the tough type (the Stackelberg type), the regulator is always diligent, while the strategic
regulator may choose to establish a false reputation by mimicking the tough type.
Our objective is to analyze whether the strategic regulator can build up a reputation that
induces the agent(s) to good behavior permanently. There is no correct model in terms of the
longevity of the strategic interaction among the players as some instances fit situations where
the regulator faces different myopic agents in each period, while others suit the regulator
facing the same agent in every period. To provide an answer and novel insight, we analyze
two extremes: (1) a long-lived regulator faces short-lived agents who play once observing the
public history of past play; (2) a long-lived regulator faces a long-lived agent.
In the first, we show that any Nash equilibrium payoff of the strategic regulator converges
to the efficient payoff as the discount factor approaches one given any interior initial (common)
belief the agents may have about the regulator’s type. Moreover, he enjoys a permanent (ab-
sorbing) reputation inducing agents’ good behavior indefinitely. Then, the strategic regulator
refrains from costly auditing and hence attains perpetual social efficiency. In furtherance, we
establish that there is a unique Markov equilibrium with a continuous and nondecreasing value
function such that the reputation for being diligent becomes permanent whenever it exceeds a
threshold: The reputation is above this level implies all the future agents will behave and the
regulator will be lax with probability one permanently. Thus, the perpetual social optimum
is secured. For low values of the regulator’s reputation, players use mixed strategies.
The intuition behind these stems from the short-lived agents only caring about their short-
run payoffs and giving myopic best responses to their updated beliefs while not considering
the information externality that they could initiate and be helpful to future generations.
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This is because, when an agent is truthful, Bayesian updating is not called for as there will
not be any signal suggesting that the regulator has not been diligent. Thus, the strategic
and patient regulator will find it beneficial to make sure that his false reputation eventually
reaches a level above which it persists as all the subsequent agents will find it optimal to
be truthful thereafter. Hence, the strategic and patient regulator guarantees the maximum
payoff (exceeding his Stackelberg payoff) in any Nash equilibrium and induce the agents to be
truthful permanently in the long-run. Thus, good behavior is attained in perpetuity thanks
to the reputation of the patient regulator and short-term incentives of the myopic agents.
The analysis is more complicated if the regulator faces a long-lived and sufficiently patient
agent. Both make their choices and update their beliefs according to their private histories
while the regulator cannot anticipate the strategy of the agent as her beliefs are private and
the long-lived patient agent will not be giving myopic best responses. However still, insisting
on a high initial reputation level may block the avenue leading to information externalities,
thereby preventing the agent from making critical inferences in the future, by inducing the
agent to be truthful with probability one and hence close the gate to Bayesian updating. This,
on the other hand, is not robust: Even if the agent were to experiment with untruthfulness
very occasionally, the agent will expose the regulator’s false reputation in the long-run. So,
there is no Nash equilibrium with sufficiently patient players, where the agent sporadically
behaves badly and the regulator enjoys a high permanent reputation and hence perpetual
social efficiency cannot be sustained in any Nash equilibrium in these cases.
The intuition behind this result is as follows: Suppose on the contrary that there is a
set of events with a positive measure on which the agent finds it optimal to be truthful on
average after some date with a very high probability. Thus, the agent must be expecting to see
the diligence with a sufficiently high probability on average from then on for sufficiently long
periods after observing her private history. In our setup, the “conditional identification of the
agent” holds which is formalized in Remark 1 and it implies that the diligent regulator can
infer the fixed behavior of the agent from the frequencies of the public signals.6 Following the
footsteps of Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2007) thanks to “conditional identification of the
6This enables us to accommodate the techniques of Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2007) suited for a
particular set of private histories of the regulator (even though their critical assumptions of full support and
full rank do not hold in our model) and surpass the complications due to private beliefs. The basic intuition
of Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) in establishing impermanency of public reputations is that the
informed player knows the beliefs of the uninformed player. Thus, she knows when her deviations from the
commitment action have virtually no effect on the opponent’s beliefs and continuation payoffs. On the other
hand, in proving disappearing private reputations, as the informed player cannot infer the opponent’s belief,
Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2007, pp.289) shows that “when the uninformed player’s private history
induces her to act as if she is convinced of some characteristic about the informed player, the informed player
must eventually be convinced that such a private history did indeed occur.”
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agent”, we establish that “if the agent’s private history implies that she is almost convinced of
facing a diligent regulator and behaves accordingly, then this eventually becomes known to the
regulator” on a particular private history of the regulator (coinciding with the agent’s private
beliefs about the regulator’s future behavior that is induced by the agent’s private history).
But then, the agent, knowing that her beliefs will eventually become known to the strategic
regulator on these particular histories where the regulator is believed to be diligent on average,
can infer that the strategic regulator (who can identify the long-run behavior of the agent on
those particular private histories of his) would be convinced that the agent believes that the
regulator will be diligent thereafter and he would act on it by choosing lazy. However, this
may not be enough to convince the agent to switch to bad behavior when the regulator’s
reputation is high. But, the agent draws the irrefutable inference that the regulator is indeed
of the strategic type and is choosing lazy since she is bound to experiment with the bad
behavior every once in a while. Indeed, every time the agent is untruthful in such situations,
the agent’s private beliefs would be updated accordingly which the regulator cannot observe
and hence respond to. Thus, there must be a period in which the agent’s private beliefs are
not compatible with facing a diligent regulator; delivering the desired contradiction.
1.1 Related Literature
Early literature studying the value of reputations focuses on settings where a long-lived player
faces a sequence of short-lived players who play once but observe the past play. These stud-
ies provide the Stackelberg payoff as the lower bound on the sufficiently patient long-lived
player’s average limiting payoff given that there is a commitment type who always chooses
the Stackelberg strategy.7 Such one-sided reputation results also arise in settings that involve
two long-lived players.8 Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004), on the other hand, shows
that a long-lived informed player, both against short-lived uninformed opponents and also a
long-lived one (with a condition on the equilibrium behavior), can maintain a permanent rep-
utation for playing a commitment strategy in a game with imperfect public monitoring only if
that strategy is an equilibrium of the complete information stage game.9 Thus, the powerful
7See Fudenberg and Levine (1989) for games with perfect monitoring, Fudenberg and Levine (1992) for
games with imperfect public monitoring and Gossner (2011) for games with any imperfect monitoring.
8These studies include: Schmidt (1993a) (conflicting interests with asymmetric discount factors); Celentani,
Fudenberg, Levine, and Pesendorfer (1996) and Aoyagi (1996) (with imperfect monitoring and asymmetric
discount factors); Cripps, Dekel, and Pesendorfer (2005) (strictly conflicting interests with equal discount fac-
tors); Atakan and Ekmekci (2012) and Atakan and Ekmekci (2015) (locally nonconflicting or strictly conflicting
interests with equal discount factors); Chan (2000) (equal discounting and commitment being dominant).
9Benabou and Laroque (1992) also provides a model of repeated strategic communication with a long-lived
insider trader who has noisy private information about the value of an asset and aims to manipulate asset
prices. They focus on the stationary Markov equilibrium and show that insider traders reveal their true type
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results about the lower bounds on the long-lived player’s average payoff are short-run reputa-
tion effects, where the long-lived informed player’s payoff is calculated at the beginning of the
game.10 Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2007) extends their disappearance of noncredible
reputations result by allowing for private beliefs in both cases and unrestricted equilibrium
strategies for the uninformed long-lived player case. For the asymptotic equilibrium behav-
ior, they show that the continuation play in every Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium
of the complete information game when the reputation is public; a correlated equilibrium of
the complete information game when the reputation is private (regardless of the longevity
of the interaction among the players). So, the selection effects of reputations on the set of
equilibrium payoffs should not be assumed to carry over asymptotically. Meanwhile, Cripps,
Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) implies non-transient reputations need the incorporation of
other mechanisms into the model. One strand of literature attains recurrent reputations by
assuming that the type of the player is governed by unobserved replacements and stochas-
tic processes through time such as Gale and Rosenthal (1994), Holmstro¨m (1999), Mailath
and Samuelson (2001), Phelan (2006), Wiseman (2008) and Ekmekci, Gossner, and Wilson
(2012). The others propose mechanisms that rely on the restricted memory of the uninformed
player(s) such as the costly discovery of histories (Liu (2011)), rating system (Ekmekci (2011)),
bounded memory (Monte (2013)) or limited record-keeping (Liu and Skrzypacz (2014)).11
Our findings concerning the asymptotic equilibrium behavior and the permanency of repu-
tation with short-lived uninformed players diverge from those of Cripps, Mailath, and Samuel-
son (2004) due to the differences in the monitoring structures: While Cripps, Mailath, and
Samuelson (2004) assumes full-support and full-rank (any signal is probable after any action
profile and identification of each player’s constant action is possible following sufficiently many
observations), our setting violates both of these assumptions.12 Our main question is whether
or not perpetual good behavior can be sustained in equilibrium via reputation. We provide
an affirmative answer with myopic uninformed players and we show that, in the case of a
long-lived uninformed player, this conclusion does not hold in any Nash equilibrium involving
asymptotically in any Markov equilibrium. Moreover, O¨zdog˜an (2014) extends the disappearing reputations
result to games with two long-lived players with incomplete information on both sides.
10The results of Fudenberg and Levine (1992) and Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) differ because
Fudenberg and Levine (1992) fixes the prior belief of being the commitment type and selects a threshold
discount factor depending on this prior above which the player is sufficiently patient for their results to hold;
whereas Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) fixes the discount factor while allowing the posterior belief to
vary which eventually becomes so low that makes the required threshold discount factor (for Fudenberg and
Levine (1992)’s result to hold) to exceed way above the fixed discount factor.
11See Mailath and Samuelson (2015) for a survey on the reputation literature.
12In particular, detection happens and is informative about the regulator’s behavior only when the agent
is untruthful (conditional identification of the regulator) and a bad signal following agent’s untruthfulness is
probable only when the regulator is diligent (conditional identification of the agent).
8
agent’s sporadic experimentation with bad behavior.
The other important work related to our short-lived agents case deals with bad reputations.
Building on Ely and Va¨lima¨ki (2003)’s motorist-mechanic example and bad reputation result,
Ely, Fudenberg, and Levine (2008) characterizes a class of games in which the following holds:
the short-run uninformed players decide whether to participate in a game with the long-
run player while every action of the long-run player that induces the short-run players to
participate may generate a signal which could suggest that the long-run player is bad. As a
result, any equilibrium payoff of a sufficiently patient long-run player is close to her payoff from
the exit decision of the short-run players (with a condition on the size of commitment types)
which is assumed to be her minmax payoff. This also suggests a patient long-run player
can attain her maximum payoff if the exit action provides her the maximum payoff (exit-
maximum). The similarity of results in terms of equilibrium payoff when the participation
games have exit-maximum lies in the fact that the public signals in Ely, Fudenberg, and
Levine (2008) satisfy our condition of conditional identification of the long-lived informed
player and the short-lived players do not find it optimal to experiment and unravel the type
of the long-lived player. This leads to a persistent reputation in both studies. Yet, the two
signaling structures differ in important ways. In their setup, there are exit signals that occur
with probability one if the short-run players choose an exit action, which cannot be observed
if the short-run players choose to participate and they are not affected by the action of the
long-lived player. However, in our model, the no detection signal that occurs with probability
one if the short-lived agents choose to be truthful (“exit”) can also be generated when the
agent chooses to be untruthful (“participate”), the probability of which then depends on the
regulator’s action. This structure gives rise to “the conditional identification of the agent”
that is the key condition in the analysis of the two long-lived player case which was left as an
open question in Ely, Fudenberg, and Levine (2008).13, 14
The organization is as follows: Section 2 presents the model. The descriptions of the
repeated games and the results with the short-lived and long-lived agent cases are provided in
Section 3 and 4, respectively. Section 5 concludes. The proofs are presented in the Appendix.
13We would like to note that Ely and Va¨lima¨ki (2003) constructs a sequential equilibrium that shows their
bad reputation result may not hold with two long-lived players in the motorist-mechanic example.
14Another strand of related reputation literature involves recent studies featuring continuous-time models
that analyze monitoring in employment contracts (e.g., Halac and Prat (2016)) and certification of quality
in product-quality choice settings (e.g., Dilme´ (2019) and Marinovic, Skrzypacz, and Varas (2018) following
Board and Meyer-ter Vehn (2013)). While only Halac and Prat (2016) and Marinovic, Skrzypacz, and Varas
(2018) endogenize the costly learning, the former focuses on dynamics and the latter analyzes costly voluntary
certification as a means to build a reputation in Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). Indeed, that study
sustains permanency of reputation in MPE with a stage game based on Board and Meyer-ter Vehn (2013)
when “the industry manages to coordinate on a good certification standard.”
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2 Model
We model the strategic interaction between the agent and regulator through a simultaneous-
move stage game.15
At the beginning of the game, the agent (she) gets some private information about the
state of nature and has the incentive to deceive the uninformed regulator (he) by strategically
manipulating information through reporting false messages. The agent can either be truthful
or untruthful about the information she has. Thus, the action set of the agent is A = {T, U}
where a ∈ A. The reporting strategy of the agent is given by σA ∈ ∆(A) where ∆(A) is the
probability simplex on A; with abuse of notation, we denote the probability that she chooses
T also by σA. The regulator is supposed to detect deviations from the truthful behavior via
costly auditing. He chooses to be diligent or lazy in auditing the agent. His choice generates
different probabilities of eliciting information about the agent’s untruthfulness if she is indeed
untruthful. The regulator’s action set is R = {D,L} while his strategy is given by σR ∈ ∆(R).
By adopting a slight abuse of notation, we let σR also denote the probability of him choosing
the diligent action.
The set of public signals is Id = {0, 1} where 1 stands for detection and 0 for no detection.
The audit quality is given by the following probability distribution on Id conditional on A×R,
which is denoted by ρ where ρ(id | a, r) is the probability of id given (a, r) ∈ A×R:
ρ(1 | U,D) = 1− ρ(0 | U,D) = β ρ(1 | T,D) = 1− ρ(0 | T,D) = 0
ρ(1 | U,L) = 1− ρ(0 | U,L) = 0 ρ(1 | T, L) = 1− ρ(0 | T, L) = 0
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the probability of detecting an agent who has chosen U if the regulator
choosesD. Notice that no detection must occur whenever the agent has chosen T as ρ(0|T, r) =
1 for all r ∈ R.
An action chosen by a player is not observable to the other. Yet, the public signals become
commonly observable at the end of the corresponding period (after all have made their choices)
and provide information about the chosen actions. More specifically, each player can infer the
other’s action only when he/she chooses a particular action. In other words, public signals
15The stage game considered here is the one presented in O¨zdog˜an (2016). The following is an alternative
formulation that parallels with those in some papers on monitoring in employment contracts, e.g., Halac and
Prat (2016): There is a business owned by a principal (he) who has to employ an agent (she) to operate. The
performance of the agent is unobservable to the principal. His options are to monitor the agent intensively (I )
or not (N ). If the agent chooses high effort (H) the outcome has to be good, g, regardless of whether or not
the principal monitors intensively. If she chooses low effort (L), there is a probability that the bad outcome, b,
occurs which can be detected only when the principal monitors the agent intensively. Otherwise, he observes
a good signal even though the agent has chosen L.
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are statistically informative about a player’s behavior conditional on the other one choosing
a particular action: the regulator can infer the fixed action chosen by the agent from the
frequencies of signals only when he has been diligent; the agent can identify the fixed action
chosen by the regulator from the frequency of the detections only when she has been untruthful.
Otherwise, no information about the opponent’s behavior is revealed. These are summarized
in Remarks 1 and 2.
Remark 1 The conditional identification of the agent’s actions is satisfied as |A| columns in
the matrix [ρ(id | a,D)]a=U,T ; id=0,1 are linearly independent. And ρ(0|U,L) = ρ(0|T, L) = 1.
Remark 2 The conditional identification of the regulator’s actions holds as |R| columns in
the matrix [ρ(id | U, r)]r=D,L; id=0,1 are linearly independent. And ρ(0|T,D) = ρ(0|T, L) = 1.
In our model, the full support assumption, typically presumed in many studies in the
literature, does not hold.
Independent of the auditing strategy of the regulator, the agent’s payoff is normalized to
zero if she chooses T . When she is untruthful, she pays a fine of l if detected and otherwise
receives a gain of g. So, uA(T,D) = uA(T, L) = 0, uA(U,L) = g, and uA(U,D) = ` =
g − β(g + l). The following ensures that the agent’s unique best response to D is T :
Assumption 1 The parameter values satisfy g
g+l
< β.
The regulator’s payoff is also normalized to zero if he chooses L and the agent T . This is
the maximum payoff the regulator can attain. Given that the agent chooses U , the regulator’s
gain is d if untruthfulness is detected and otherwise his expected loss is f . The regulator
incurs a cost of c if he chooses D. Thus, regulator’s expected payoffs are: uR(T, L) = 0,
uR(T,D) = −c, uR(U,D) = −e = βd− (1− β)f − c, and uR(U,L) = −f .16
The resulting ex-ante (expected) stage game payoffs are presented in Table 1.
We employ the following restriction on the regulator’s payoffs.
Assumption 2 The parameter values satisfy c
d+f
< β < f
d+f
.
16Our ex post and ex ante payoff specifications differ from the ones typically assumed in the literature where
a player’s ex post payoff is presumed to depend on a player’s own action and the public signal and the ex ante
payoff to equal the expectation of the ex post payoffs taken over the opponents’ actions. If we had followed this
type of specification, we would have obtained uR(U,L) = uR(T, L) for the regulator as he would be choosing
the same action and receiving the same signal of no detection with probability one. However then, the forgone
societal loss due to the agent choosing U would not be captured. We depart away from the literature in
that regard to accommodate the influence of the conditional identification assumptions on ex-ante payoffs by
reflecting the effects of the public signals on the ex-post payoffs only when the agent chooses U . Otherwise,
the realized payoff of the regulator is independent of the signal and depends only on his own action D.
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D L
T 0,−c 0, 0
U −`,−e g,−f
Table 1: Ex ante stage game payoffs under complete information
The first inequality implies uR(U,D) > uR(U,L) and the second uR(T,D) > uR(U,D).
Thus, the regulator’s expected payoffs are ordered as follows: 0 = uR(T, L) > uR(T,D) >
uR(U,D) > uR(U,L) = −f .
Under this construction, no matter what the regulator chooses, he prefers the agent to be
truthful as the implied expected loss in case of untruthfulness, f , is higher than the cost of
being diligent, c.17 Thus, the regulator would like to convince the agent for being diligent to
induce truthfulness, which is the regulator-preferred action. However, the regulator wants to
be lazy if he thinks that the agent is truthful while he has an incentive to be diligent if he
believes that the agent is going to be untruthful.
Additionally, we assume that g < f so that the regulator’s payoff maximizing action profile
is also maximizing the total welfare.18








Next, we discuss some important properties of the ex-ante stage game payoff structure.
First, the minmax payoffs (both in pure and mixed strategies) are as follows: 0 for the agent
with (T,D) being the pure action profile that minmaxes the agent; −e for the regulator
with (U,D) being the pure action profile that minmaxes the regulator. Second, the pure
Stackelberg action of the regulator is D and D mixed-action minmaxes the agent. Thus,
following Schmidt (1993b), the stage game described in the current paper has conflicting
17Consider the situation where the ex-post payoffs depend on a player’s own action and the public signals.
Let u∗R(1, D) denote the realized payoff following D and signal “detection” and u
∗
R(0, D) the realized payoff
following action D and signal “no detection”. Then, uR(T,D) = u
∗
R(0, D). Thus, uR(T,D) > uR(U,D) thanks
to Assumption 2 implies u∗R(0, D) > u
∗
R(1, D). This may be puzzling at first sight as the signal “detection”
is the rewarding signal for the regulator. However, observing “no detection” is more likely when the agent
chooses T (having a probability of 1/(1 +β)) compared to observing “no detection” when the agent chooses U
(associated with a probability β/(1+β)). Thus, the former intrinsically incorporates that it is less likely for the
regulator to incur a forgone societal loss due to untruthfulness. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing
out that a justification for uR(T,D) > uR(U,D) can be attained by considering a situation where “detection”
of untruthfulness has follow-up (disciplinary) procedures requiring the regulator to perform additional tasks
(e.g., preparing and presenting the resulting case in a court of law) and hence reducing his ex-ante payoffs.
18We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this observation.
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interests. The regulator’s preferred opponent action is T which is also the unique best response
to the Stackelberg action D; whereas the agent’s preferred opponent action is L.19
To induce uncertainty about the regulator’s preferences and obtain a model with repu-
tation, we incorporate a behavioral type into the game following Harsanyi (1967-68), Kreps
and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982).20 In particular, the regulator can be
one of two types: tough or strategic. The tough regulator is committed to being diligent
(which is the pure Stackelberg action for the strategic type), whereas the strategic one has the
preferences described above. The regulator knows his true type while the belief of the agent
that the regulator is tough (i.e., the reputation of the regulator) is given by γ ∈ (0, 1). Now,
the agent’s equilibrium behavior (determined by her belief about the probability of detection)
depends on her belief about the regulator’s type. Let pi(γ, σR) be the expected probability
of detection, i.e., pi ≡ pi(γ, σR) = γβ + (1 − γ)σRβ. Then, the agent’s problem is to choose
σA ∈ [0, 1] to maximize
(1− σA) [(1− pi)g − pil] (1)
There is a cutoff value of detection, pi∗ = g
g+l
, determining the optimal behavior of the agent:
her best response equals {U} if pi(γ, σR) < pi∗ and {T} if pi(γ, σR) > pi∗. The equilibrium of
the incomplete information game is presented in Lemma 1 and its proof is in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 The following strategy profile (σA, σR) constitutes a Nash equilibrium,
1. σA = 1 and σR = 0 if γ ≥ γ∗,
2. σA = 1− cβ(d+f) and σR = g−γβ(g+l)(1−γ)β(g+l) = pi
∗−γβ
(1−γ)β if γ < γ
∗,
where the cutoff value of the belief is γ∗ = g
β(g+l)
∈ (0, 1).
This lemma establishes that there is no equilibrium in which the regulator chooses to be
diligent with probability one. If the belief that the regulator is tough is above a threshold,
19If Assumption 2 is violated and uR(T, L) > uR(U,D) > uR(T,D) > uR(U,L), then the Stackelberg action
of the regulator is still D and (U,D) minmaxes the regulator; however, the Stackelberg action profile gives a
payoff strictly less than the minmax payoff. Hence, the reputation of being diligent will have no use to the
regulator. So, the strategic regulator will separate himself from a diligent behavioral type. If, on the other
hand, uR(T, L) > uR(U,D) > uR(U,L) > uR(T,D), then (U,D) still minmaxes the regulator but this time L
becomes the pure Stackelberg action and the Stackelberg profile (U,L) provides a payoff strictly less than the
minmax payoff (U,D) provides. Hence, the resulting model is similar to the one we solve.
20If β = 1, the agent choosing U implies in two possible outcomes: Detection whenever the regulator chooses
D; and no detection whenever the regulator has chosen L. The second contingency indicates that he is of
the strategic type. Thus, the game becomes one with perfect monitoring. Therefore, Fudenberg and Levine
(1989) and Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) imply that the informed player would not risk additional
payoffs but obtain the Stackelberg level and maintain his reputation. Moreover, having β = 1 contradicts with
Assumption 2 as we can no longer have β < ff+d .
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then the agent is truthful with probability one; anticipating this, the regulator chooses to
be lazy with probability one. Otherwise, players go for the mixed strategy specified in the
lemma. Moreover, the equilibrium strategies are monotone in the prior belief.
3 Dynamic game with short-lived agents
The game begins at time t = 1 and is infinitely repeated. The regulator is the long-lived
player with a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1), and the agents are short-lived (myopic) players. The
agent of a period t, agent t, plays only in that period and cares only about her own payoff. In
each period, the players simultaneously choose actions from their action sets.
The regulator’s type is determined once and for all before the beginning of the game, and
the common prior belief about the regulator being tough is γ0 ∈ (0, 1).
The reputation affects behavior only when the short-lived agents have information about
past detections. Hence, we suppose that in every t, agent t observes the public history of
signals ht (while h1 stands for the unique null history) consisting of whether or not each of
the preceding agents has been detected. We let htR be the private history of the regulator. It
is composed of ht and his past actions up to time t. A strategy for the long-lived player is a
sequence of maps σR,t(h
t
R) ∈ ∆(R) and a strategy of agent t is σA,t(ht) ∈ ∆(A).
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile σ such that for all t and positive probability
histories ht and htR, (1) σA,t(h




is a best response of the strategic regulator against σA,t(h
t). Given a strategy profile σ, the
prior belief γ0 and a public history h
t that has positive probability under σ, we can find the
conditional probability of long-lived strategic player action σR,t(h
t) that depends on the public
history. Thereby, we restrict attention to public strategies and public equilibria.
The posterior belief of agent t at the beginning of period t is γt−1(ht) with γ0(h1) = γ0.
When the meaning is clear, we shorten γt−1(ht) to γt−1 As each agent is short-lived, their
decision depends only on the updated reputation of the regulator, the strategic regulator’s
expected behavior, and the resulting detection probability. If γt−1 ≥ γ∗, agent t chooses T and
the strategic regulator L delivering each a payoff of zero and sustaining efficiency. If γt−1 < γ∗,
then agent t chooses U with some probability only if the strategic regulator is diligent with no
more than probability pi
∗−γt−1β
(1−γt−1)β as from the perspective of agent t the probability of detection
at t is
pi(γt−1, σR,t(ht)) ≡ γt−1 β + (1− γt−1) σR,t(ht) β. (2)
Bayesian updating is needed at the end of period t if agent t has chosen U (see Remark
2). If agent t is truthful, the reputation of regulator does not change as there is no new
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information, i.e., γt = γt−1. Then, given that agent t is untruthful, the reputation after the













γt−1(1−β)+(1−γt−1)[σR,t(1−β)+(1−σR,t)] if id = 0.
(3)
3.1 Nash equilibrium payoff of the regulator
O¨zdog˜an (2016) shows that when the agents are short-lived, the reputation helps the patient
strategic regulator to achieve the maximum attainable payoff (i.e., the socially efficient level)
for any prior belief agents may have about the types of the regulator. Specifically, for any
prior belief γ0 > 0, the average payoff of the strategic regulator across all Nash equilibria
converges to zero (the maximum payoff of the regulator) as δ approaches one.
Let Vˆ (γ0, δ) be the minimum payoff for the strategic regulator in some Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1 For any prior belief γ0 > 0 and auditing quality β ∈ (0, 1) satisfying Assumptions
1 and 2, limδ→1 Vˆ (γ0, δ) = 0.
This theorem says that the slightest uncertainty about the type of the regulator guarantees
the patient strategic regulator the best outcome in any Nash equilibrium. This outcome
provides more utility than his Stackelberg payoff of −c.21 Thus, the reputation is a useful tool
in achieving the regulator-preferred and total welfare-maximizing outcome.
The techniques in Ely and Va¨lima¨ki (2003) are employed in the proof presented in Ap-
pendix B.22 The intuition of the result follows from the fact that the short-lived agents only
care about their own payoffs and give myopic best responses to their updated beliefs about
the regulator’s type. The myopic agent plays truthfully if and only if her belief about the reg-
ulator being diligent is above a threshold. In such cases, there is no learning and the regulator
attains his maximum payoff as there is no need to engage in costly auditing (Lemma 2). Thus,
whenever the public histories lead to a strong belief about the regulator being tough, all the
agents are truthful and the regulator is lazy thereafter. At histories where the agent is not
yet strongly convinced of the regulator being diligent, she has an incentive to be untruthful.
21When the payoff bound established by Gossner (2011) is applied to the current context, we find that the
lower bound of the regulator’s payoff in any Nash equilibrium approaches the Stackelberg payoff of −c as he
gets arbitrarily patient (since the unique 0-entropy confirming best response of the agent to the Stackelberg
action D is T with the associated bound being −c < 0).
22Unlike ours, the long-lived player’s concern for differentiating himself from his bad counterpart results in
the loss of all surplus in their bad-reputation model.
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This leads to an incentive for the strategic regulator to be diligent with some probability to
induce a possible increase in the agent’s belief. After the event of subsequent detections, the
reputation would eventually reach a level above which it persists as all the agents will find
it optimal to be truthful thereafter. Hence, the regulator receives a payoff different than his
maximum for a finite number of periods and the permanency of the reputation would enable a
sufficiently patient strategic regulator to capture all the surplus (i.e., sustain social efficiency)
in the long-run.23
When γ0 < γ
∗, a typical equilibrium starts with (totally) mixed actions involving agents
experimenting with untruthfulness. Some of these will be detected and this will continue until
the posterior belief about the regulator being tough gets strong enough. Thereafter, (T, L)
will be played in every period and the reputation for being tough will persist.
3.2 Markov equilibrium
Now, we consider a single short-lived agent who is restricted to use history independent Markov
strategies. This situation also corresponds to cases in which agent t is one of a continuum of
long-lived (population of) agents, coordination/communication among agents (across periods)
is not possible, and all agents observe the same public history.24
We characterize the stationary Markov equilibria with the reputation of the regulator being
the Markov state variable and the players’ strategies of being truthful and diligent, σA(γ) and
σR(γ), are functions of only the current reputation level (and not the public history).
The strategic regulator maximizes the normalized discounted sum of expected payoffs and
the agents give myopic best responses given the reputation level as to optimize (1) as before.
We let V (γ) denote the expected life-time payoff to a strategic regulator associated with the
23Lemma 4 in Appendix B suggests that every Nash equilibrium continuation path starting from history ht
at which γt−1 < γ∗ must include a play of diligence with some probability. Thus, there is a positive probability
of detection in every continuation path. Since for the agent to be untruthful, the regulator’s diligence must
be lower than pi
∗−γt−1β
(1−γt−1)β , the smallest posterior belief after a detection would be
γβ
pi∗ > γ.
24There are many cases where coordination among the agents and the regulator for future punish-
ments/rewards is not plausible (e.g., a large number of taxpayers, agents, are audited by the tax authority,
the regulator) if agents do not receive the same signal and the individual signals are not publicly observed
by the others. In such cases, it is most innocuous to assume that each agent receives privately observed and
independently drawn (i.e., idiosyncratic signals) breaking the coordinated behavior among the agents and
the regulator to provide intertemporal incentives (punishment/experimentation) in the continuation games.
Mailath and Samuelson (2015) points out that one can construct an equilibrium with coordinated punishments
if the idiosyncratic signals are public or they all receive the same signal in a stylized version of Mailath and
Samuelson (2001). (Mailath and Samuelson (2006, Remark 18.1.3) provides a construction with idiosyncratic
signals in the context of Mailath and Samuelson (2001).) However, the idiosyncrasy of signals causes techni-
cal complications (see, for instance, Al-Najjar (1995)) and divert attention away from the reputation effects.
Thus, to abstract away from these technical complications and to capture the myopic incentives of the agents
due to lack of coordination devices in a large population environment, it suffices to consider a continuum of
agents who cannot communicate/coordinate among each other but receive the same signal.
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strategy (σA, σR) ≡ (σA(γ), σR(γ)). The value function V (γ) satisfies:












In the complete-information case (when γ = 0), with history-independent strategies, the
only equilibrium is the repetition of the stage-game equilibrium. This is because then
V = (1− δ){σR[(1− σA) (βd− (1− β)f)− c]− (1− σR)(1− σA)f}+ δV
and the agent chooses σA =
β(d+f)−c
β(d+f)
∈ (0, 1) in order to make the regulator indifferent. In turn,




The corresponding value is − cf
β(d+f)
< 0 due to Assumption 2.
The (stationary) Markov equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 1 A stationary Markov equilibrium consists of the strategy profile (σ∗A(γ), σ
∗
R(γ))
and the corresponding beliefs such that for all γ ∈ [0, 1]:





the agent’s problem given in (1);
2. Given σ∗A(γ), σ
∗
R(γ) maximizes the associated value function V (γ) given in (4);
3. Posterior beliefs are determined via Bayes’ rule whenever possible (i.e., when σ∗A < 1)
according to (3).
An equilibrium value function V : [0, 1] → [−f, 0] should satisfy the Bellman equation
given by (4). So, it should be a fixed point of the operator T which maps any continuation
value function W into W¯ in the following way:
W¯ (γ) = TW (γ)












where σR(γ) maximizes the right-hand side of the equation (5) given σA(γ) while σA(γ) max-
imizes (1) given the expected probability of detection pi(γ, σR) implied by σR(γ).
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We focus on the equilibrium that is associated with a value function that is continuous
and nondecreasing in the reputation, γ. Let C+ denote the space of such value functions
endowed with the sup norm. We show that there is a unique Markov equilibrium with a
continuous and nondecreasing value function where players use mixed strategies for low values
of the regulator’s reputation, whereas the agents are truthful and the regulator is lazy with
probability one above a threshold state.
Theorem 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, there is a unique stationary
Markov equilibrium (σ∗A(γ), σ
∗
R(γ)) with a continuous and nondecreasing value function V
such that γ ≤ γ∗ implies
σ∗A(γ) = 1−
(1− δ)c





and γ ≥ γ∗ implies
σ∗A(γ) = 1 and σ
∗
R(γ) = 0
where γ∗ = g
β(g+l)
and pi∗ = g
g+l
. Moreover, the reputation persists whenever it exceeds γ∗ with
the corresponding value function attaining its maximum value, i.e., V (γ) = 0 for any γ ≥ γ∗.
The proof, relegated to Appendix C, is built upon a couple of lemmas that follow from
Benabou and Laroque (1992): We start by taking a continuous and nondecreasing value
function W ∈ C+ as given, call the associated problem involving this continuation payoff a
short-term game, and show that there exists a unique profile σA(γ;W ) and σR(γ;W ) such
that the following holds: σR(γ;W ) maximizes the right-hand side of (5) given σA(γ;W ),
and σA(γ;W ) maximizes (1) given the expected probability of detection pi(γ, σR) induced by
σR(γ;W ). We call this unique equilibrium for any given W ∈ C+ as the temporary equilibrium
of the short-term game. Then, we consider the operator that maps the continuation valuation
W into current valuation resulting from the outcomes of the optimization of the short-term
game T (W ) : γ ∈ [0, 1]→ W¯ (γ,W ) and show that the resulting W¯ (γ) is also a continuous and
nondecreasing function, i.e., W¯ ∈ C+. Lastly, it is shown that T : C+ → C+ is a contraction
mapping so that there is a unique fixed point of T in C+, which we call V .
The stationary Markov equilibrium induces a Nash equilibrium. Note that there is a unique
concatenation history after all histories ending with the absorbing state and both equilibria
specify the same pure action profile of truthful and lazy thereafter. Given γ < γ∗, Markov
equilibrium specifies a completely mixed action profile so that every public history is reached
with a strictly positive probability. Let any public history that is induced by the stationary
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Markov equilibrium σ∗(γ) be denoted by htm ≡ ht(σ∗(γ)). Then, we describe the associated
Nash equilibrium as σ(htm) = σ
∗(γt−1), for any htm starting with the same belief γt−1(h
t
m). As
in any Nash equilibrium, the regulator attains the maximum payoff as δ tends to 1 (Theorem
1), the payoff under the stationary Markov equilibrium also approaches the maximum payoff
as δ approaches 1. This theorem says that for γ < γ∗, the regulator and each short-lived agent
play mixed actions that result in a positive probability of producing consecutive detections.25
We identify an upper bound on the number of consecutive detections that can be observed
at each reputation level provided that the agent chooses U whenever she is indifferent between
her actions. This bound is also the minimum number of periods that the regulator has to
invest to build up reputation at that state which would be permanent thereafter. Corollary 1
establishes this upper bound.26
Corollary 1 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and ht be a positive probability history
involving k consecutive detections starting date τ with respect to the unique Markov equilibrium
defined in Theorem 2. Then, k can be at most the smallest integer that is greater than k∗γ where
k∗γ =
log(γ∗)−log(γ)
log(β)−log(pi∗) for γ ≡ γτ−1(ht) < γ∗.
When β = 1− pi∗, an observation of detection followed by no detection or vice versa does
not change the posterior belief. Hence, the posterior probability depends only on the number
of different public signals in history and not on the order that they have been observed. Thus,
the concatenation of any history that involves at least k∗γ0 more detections than no detections
continues with a persistent reputation of at least γ∗.27
25{γt}t is a martingale. The details are in Section 4 and in the discussion in Appendix D starting on page 40
and in Footnote 41 which can be verified in the Markovian context by Theorem 2 and Lemma 8 (presented in
Appendix C). Therefore, the evolution of beliefs is such that, no matter what has happened in the past (and
regardless of whether or not the agent is short-lived), the expectation of future beliefs about the regulator
being the tough type conditional on the current information must equal today’s value. By employing Lemma
8, we also observe that the belief at the beginning of tomorrow, γt, cannot equal the belief at the beginning
of today, γt−1 (even though this must hold for the expected values) whenever the agent has chosen U in t. In
fact, γt must either be γ
+(γt−1) or γ−(γt−1) with some probabilities specified by Theorem 2 and equation (3).
26Suppose that the parameters are given as γ0 =
1
2 , β =
3
4 and pi
∗ = gg+l =
2
3 . The threshold reputation




9−9γ for γ ≤ γ∗. Under
Markov strategy σ∗R, γ
+(γ) = 98γ after a detection and γ
−(γ) = 34γ after no detection. The smallest k, at
which the reputation exceeds γ∗ = 89
∼= 0.89 after observing of consecutive k detections is 5.
27It would be interesting to compute the expected time until the agent stops being untruthful, i.e., the
expected hitting time until the Markov chain starting from γ0 reaches the absorbing state γ
∗. Suppose that
β = 1 − pi∗, which implies pi∗ < 12 as β > pi∗. Then, we get a Markov chain with infinitely countable states
where γk∗γ0 , that is the reputation level after k
∗
γ0 many detections, is the only absorbing state and all other
states are transient. One can construct an example in which, starting from γ0, it is sufficient to observe only
one detection to reach the absorbing state. But, when this is the case, the Markov equilibrium requires that
the regulator chooses to be diligent with a very small probability and the expected hitting (absorption) time
becomes unboundedly large as the transition probability puts higher weight on the lower levels of reputation.
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3.3 Possible extensions
Given the seminal result of Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) establishing the imper-
manency of reputation effects (obtained when the long-lived player’s action is imperfectly ob-
served but all the signals are statistically informative about the long-lived informed player’s
behavior), in the literature, the survival of the reputation effects is mainly generated by two
means: (1) unobserved replacements of the long-lived player with a new copy, and this intro-
duces persistent changes in the type of long-lived player (e.g., Benabou and Laroque (1992),
Gale and Rosenthal (1994), Holmstro¨m (1999), Mailath and Samuelson (2001), Phelan (2006),
Wiseman (2008) and Ekmekci, Gossner, and Wilson (2012)); (2) limited observability of his-
tories, i.e., the bounded memory of short-lived uninformed players (e.g., Liu (2011), Ekmekci
(2011) and Liu and Skrzypacz (2014)). Below we discuss how our results will change if we
extend our Markov model to these directions.
First, we consider a setting with unobserved replacements and changing types: Suppose
that in each period, the regulator survives to the next period with probability λ and otherwise
is replaced with a new regulator. The new regulator is the behavioral type with probability
γˆ. To simplify exposition, we assume that γ0 = (1 − λ)γˆ. Then, when the agent chooses U ,
the posterior belief that the regulator is the Stackelberg type in period t after the observation






γt−1β+(1−γt−1)σR,tβ + (1− λ)γˆ if id = 1
γ−t = λ
γt−1(1−β)
γt−1(1−β)+(1−γt−1)[σR,t(1−β)+(1−σR,t)] + (1− λ)γˆ if id = 0
(6)
while γt = λγt−1 + (1 − λ)γˆ (***) when the agent is truthful. Then, with replacement we
get the following result the proof of which parallels with the proof Theorem 2 and hence is
omitted due to space considerations:
Proposition 1 There is a unique stationary Markov equilibrium with the replacement of the
regulator that possesses a continuous and nondecreasing value function V rep. Moreover, if the
survival rate of the regulator is sufficiently low (i.e., λ < γ∗−γ0), then the posterior beliefs are
always below γ∗, there is no absorbing state, and the agent is never truthful with probability
one. And for any γ ∈ (0, γ∗),
σ∗A(γ) = 1−
(1− δλ)c





In this case, the resulting dynamic programming problem is very similar to the one in
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Appendix C.28 The condition λ < γ∗ − γ0 implies that the posterior beliefs cannot exceed
the threshold γ∗.29 Thus, with a highly probable replacement possibility the regulator cannot
attain the maximum and socially efficient payoff of zero and hence his payoffs and efficiency
are adversely affected. This is because, in this case, agents cannot get strongly convinced that
the regulator is the tough type. Indeed, with such a replacement structure, the agents will
never be sure of the true type of the regulator.
Ekmekci, Gossner, and Wilson (2012), on the other hand, shows that the replacement of
the long-lived player can generate permanent reputation effects if the replacements are arbi-
trarily infrequent and the long-lived player is arbitrarily patient.30 They provide lower bounds
(albeit might be quite small) on equilibrium payoffs in every continuation game, which coin-
cides with those of Fudenberg and Levine (1989), Fudenberg and Levine (1992) and Gossner
(2011), without making any specific assumptions on the stage game payoffs and the monitor-
ing structure as the discount rate goes to one at a faster rate than the replacement rate goes
to zero.31 This payoff bound corresponds to the Stackelberg payoff of the regulator that is
−c in our setting. Yet, the regulator could do better as λ approaches 1 in our model. The
posterior beliefs that are given by (6) and (***) imply that the absorbing states reemerge and
the regulator’s payoff approaches zero as in no replacement case of Theorem 2. Thus, we can
conclude that unobserved and very rare replacements do not affect our results.
Second, we consider a setting in which the agents have access only to the recent piece
of the history (rather than the entire history) of play:32 Suppose that each agent t is born
with the same prior belief γ0 and can observe only the last k entries of the public history.
So, agent t’s behavior depends on the k-tail of public history at t (all signals in periods
τ = t − k, . . . , t − 1). To eliminate the possibility of deriving complicated inferences with
bounded memory (see Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian (2016, Section 5)), we suppose that
agent t’s behavior does not depend on the calendar time, t.
When k is strictly less than k∗γ0 , there is no hope of the regulator to strongly convince
28The posterior probabilities stated in (6) and (***) should be substituted into the expressions (12) and
(13); δ must be replaced by λδ. Hence, the construction in Appendix C can be replicated and the updating
takes the following form: γ+ = λγβpi∗ + (1− λ)γˆ and γ− = λγ(1−β)1−pi∗ + (1− λ)γˆ.
29Note that if λ = 0, we get the repetition of the stage game Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
30The reason is that the renewed doubt about the informed player’s type provides him the chance to rebuild
a reputation when it is damaged and this dominates the adverse effect of the loss in the value of the reputation
of the long-lived player because of the possibility of replacement when the limits on the replacement rate and
discount rate are taken appropriately.
31More precisely, as established by Ekmekci, Gossner, and Wilson (2012, pp.164), “if the discount rate goes
to one at a faster rate than the rate at which the logarithm of the replacement rate goes to infinity.”
32It maybe that the short-lived players do not observe any of the previous outcomes without exerting time,
effort, or cost. Liu (2011) constructs a class of equilibria that exhibits reputation cycles in a perfect-monitoring
product-choice game incorporating costly discovery of past actions.
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the agents that he is tough (i.e., inducing a posterior belief strictly exceeding γ∗). Thus,
the persistent reputation effect, desired by the regulator, disappears and he would want to
announce the relevant part of the public history to restore the reputation effect.33
With bounded but long memory, the analysis becomes more complicated. Liu and Skrzy-
pacz (2014) analyzes a variation of perfect-monitoring product-choice game with limited but
long records of the history. They establish that if the record length exceeds a finite lower
bound, then an arbitrarily patient long-lived player can attain the Stackelberg payoff as the
limiting payoff in any stationary perfect Bayesian equilibria after every history, which gives
rise to permanent reputation effects. The equilibria feature recurrent reputation bubbles.
Even though the long-lived player’s true type is perfectly observed, the informed short-lived
players ride up the reputation up to a level after which it is exploited by the long-lived player
(hence, revealing his type). Ekmekci (2011), on the other hand, examines a version of the
product-choice game with imperfect public monitoring where the public signals are observed
by a mediator (rating agency) announcing one of the finite numbers of ratings to the short-
lived players. Ekmekci (2011) shows that there exists a finite rating system that induces a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the sufficiently patient long-lived player’s payoff is close
to the Stackelberg payoff after every history implying permanent reputation effects.
We conjecture that with a bounded but long memory, a detailed analysis (which is outside
the scope of the current paper) would establish that reputation effects would prevail.
4 Regulator faces a long-lived agent
Now, we assume that the agent is long-lived with the common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Each
long-lived player observes the realization of the public signals and his or her own previous
actions. Then, we have htR = ((r0, id0), (r1, id1), ..., (rt−1, idt−1)) ∈ H tR ≡ (R × Id)t for the
regulator and htA = ((a0, id0), (a1, id1), ..., (at−1, idt−1)) ∈ H tA ≡ (A × Id)t for the agent to
show the private histories up to period t. As before, ht = (id0, id1, ..., idt−1) ∈ I td denotes the
public history of signals observed by both players. The set of full histories is then shown by
htf = ((a0, r0, id0), (a1, r1, id1), ..., (at−1, rt−1, idt−1)) ∈ H tf ≡ (A × R × Id)t. The filtration on
(A×R× Id)∞ induced by private and public histories are denoted by {Hit}∞t=0 for i = {A,R}
and {Ht}∞t=0, respectively. We let K = {tough, strategic} be the type space for the regulator.
Then, the strategy of the regulator, σR, is a sequence of maps σRt : H
t
R ×K → ∆(R). We let
σR ≡ (σˆR, σ˜R) where σˆR is the strategy of the tough type, who always plays diligent (action D)
with probability one regardless of his private history, and σ˜R is the strategy of the strategic
33For instance, if β = 1−pi∗, the regulator would like to announce any part of the history that has involved
at least k∗γ0 more detections than no detections to each agent.
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type. Agent’s strategy, σA, is a sequence of maps σAt : H
t
A → ∆(A). The prior belief γ0
with strategies σR ≡ (σˆR, σ˜R) and σA induce a probability measure Q on the set of states
Ω ≡ K × (R × A× Id)∞, which illustrates how the game evolves for an uninformed player.34
The strategy profiles σˆ ≡ (σA, σˆR) and σ˜ ≡ (σA, σ˜R) induce probability measures Qˆ and Q˜ on
Ω, describing the evolution of the game when the regulator is tough type and strategic type,
respectively. The expectation taken with respect to Q is E ≡ E(σA,σˆR,σ˜R) and the expectations
associated with Qˆ and Q˜ are Eˆ ≡ E(σA,σˆR) and E˜ ≡ E(σA,σ˜R), respectively.




tuA(a, r)] ≥ E(σ¯A,σˆR,σ˜R)[(1− δ)
∑∞
t=0 δ




tuR(a, r)] ≥ E(σA,σ¯R)[(1− δ)
∑∞
t=0 δ
tuR(a, r)], for all σ¯R.
In the following, as discussed in the introduction, we concentrate on Nash equilibria in
which there is costly learning on the agent’s behalf: She is bound to experiment with the
bad behavior every once in a while. This, in turn, delivers the notion that we call an α-Nash
equilibrium with α > 0 and arbitrarily small: An α-Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium
in which the agent is restricted to choose any one of her actions with at least α probability.
Ours is a direct approach. Instead, we could adopt the following formulation involving
one-period amnesia:35 Suppose that the initial belief, γ0 ∈ (0, γ∗) where γ∗ is as in Lemma
1. In every period t, the agent may experience one-period amnesia with a probability of
ϑ > 0 arbitrarily small. While it is common knowledge that she will recover at the end of the
period, whether or not she suffers from one-period amnesia in a given period is her private
information. If there is no amnesia, it is business as usual: The agent observes her private
history htA (hence, γt−1) and chooses accordingly. However, in case of amnesia when choosing
her period t action, she observes neither her private nor the public history, htA, and hence
cannot infer γt−1. Thus, from her perspective, it is indistinguishable from the start of the
game apart from the calendar time t. To avoid serious complications (see Barlo, Carmona,
and Sabourian (2016)), it is natural to consider strategies that do not use the calendar time
in these cases: her action, hence, cannot depend on t. In this contingency, we require her to
behave according to the unique Markov equilibrium of Theorem 2 hanging on to her initial
34The discussion starting on page 40 and in Footnote 40 establishes that {γt}t is a Martingale.
35One may think of the following detailed scenario: The agent uses reading glasses to keep a notebook that
contains her records. In the morning (the beginning) of the period t, there is an ϑ chance that she cannot find
her glasses. If they are not misplaced, she uses them to check her notebook and observe her private history
and chooses her action by noontime accordingly. But if her glasses cannot be found, she cannot check her
notebook by noon and hence has to choose an action without knowing the past and caring about the calendar
time. The glasses do not get lost. At the end of the day, she finds them and uses them to record today’s
observations also performing the Bayesian updating if needed.
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belief γ0 < γ
∗. This provides a consistent formulation because players’ behavior depends only
on the level of reputation (and no other aspect related to the past play) in that equilibrium.
Hence, her choice would be U with a probability of (1−σ∗A(γ0)) as γ0 < γ∗. At the end of period
t, she recovers from the amnesia, observes htA along with her period t choice at, whether or
not there has been a detection in period t (i.e., idt), performs the Bayesian updating if idt = 1
(i.e., there was a detection in period t), records these as ht+1A (hence, γt), and gets ready for
tomorrow. When ϑ > 0 is set to be arbitrarily small, the incentives of the strategic regulator
and the agent do not get affected. Thus, a Nash equilibrium of this formulation with ϑ > 0 is
an α-Nash equilibrium with α = ϑ(1− σ∗A(γ0)) > 0.
Regardless of the formulation employed, this notion of robustness does not imply qualita-
tive changes to our results with myopic agents. If the short-lived players were to be restricted
to choose any one of their actions with a probability α > 0 but sufficiently small, the regula-
tor’s best response does not change and calls for the diligent action for histories with γt−1 ≤ γ∗
and being lazy otherwise. Hence, the findings presented in Section 3.1 continue to hold with
some small modifications to their statements and proofs. Moreover, the same holds for our
results concerning Markov equilibrium: the modification implied in Theorem 2 involves chang-
ing its statement so that σ∗A(γ) = 1− α for any γ ≥ γ∗ while the values of γ∗, pi∗, and σ∗R(γ)
do not change and V (γ) needs a slight alteration.
The following result, Theorem 3, states that in every α-Nash equilibrium with α > 0
and arbitrarily small, the sufficiently patient agent plays the regulator-preferred action T
with a probability bounded away from 1 − α on average indefinitely on a strictly positive
probability set of events. That is, the regulator cannot build the absorbing reputation that
induces the patient agent to be truthful indefinitely in the long-run in equilibrium whenever
learning/experimenting is enforced even with an arbitrarily small probability. In this sense,
the permanency of reputation is not robust.
Theorem 3 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and let (σ˜A, σ˜R) be any α-Nash equilib-
rium with α > 0 and arbitrarily small. Then, there is δα ∈ (0, 1) such that there exists no
A ⊂ Ω with Q˜(A) > 0 that is induced by this α-Nash equilibrium such that for all ω ∈ A,
lim
t→∞
‖σˆA − E˜[σ˜At | HAt]‖ = α
for all δ > δα.
Appendix D is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3. The technique that employs the
identification conditions is borrowed from Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2007) and adapted
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to our setting as follows: Thanks to Remark 1, the regulator can identify private histories of
the agent in which she plays the truthful action T with a constant probability in the long run
if the regulator were to concentrate on histories in which he is diligent. This is stated formally
in Lemma 12 in Appendix D. On the other hand, Remark 2 empowers the agent to identify
private histories of the regulator who plays diligently with a constant probability when the
agent restricts attention to histories in which she plays U and such histories are sustained in
an α-Nash equilibrium. This is presented formally in Lemma 11 in Appendix D.
The intuition behind the result is as follows: Suppose on the contrary that there is a set
of events with strictly positive measure, A, on which the agent finds it optimal to play the
truthful action T with a probability close to 1 − α in all continuation histories after some
period t¯. The agent finds it optimal to play T with a high probability indefinitely implies
that she expects to see the diligent action D with a sufficiently high probability on average
for a long enough period after every s ≥ t¯ observing her private history. The key step in
our proof is Lemma 12 which says that “if the agent’s private history ensured that she is
almost convinced that she faces a diligent regulator and behaves according to that belief, then
this eventually becomes inferred by the regulator” on a particular private history where the
regulator is choosing D. Therefore, the strategic regulator would find it optimal to deviate
and play the lazy action L on those histories. At first, the agent may act as the regulator
wishes if his reputation is at a high level. However, in every period there is α > 0 chance
that the agent tests the regulator’s reputation. Every time this happens, the reputation level
of the strategic regulator gets updated. Indeed, thanks to Remark 2 (saying that the fixed
action of the regulator can be inferred by the agent when she chooses U), there is a period
when the agent (restricting attention to her private histories with her choosing U) deduces
that her opponent is not choosing D but L. Hence, we get a contradiction on such a set of
events, A, with a positive probability measure.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the long-run equilibrium behavior of uninformed players in a repeated
game with incomplete information and imperfect public monitoring that aims to model the
strategic interaction in a regulatory environment. We ask whether the uninformed players
(agents) can be induced to good behavior permanently through the reputation concerns of
the informed player (regulator). We provide a positive answer to this question when a patient
long-lived regulator faces a sequence of short-lived agents: using his reputation, the regulator
prevents agents’ bad behavior by inducing them to behave in the long-run with no cost in
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any Nash equilibrium. As a result, reputation secures the perpetual social efficiency. On the
other hand, we show that permanent good behavior cannot be an equilibrium outcome when
the long-lived agent is sufficiently patient and occasionally experiments with bad behavior.
This stark contrast demonstrates the significance of the longevity of the strategic interaction
and provides a novel insight into the importance of learning and experimentation in repeated
games: While the sufficiently patient strategic regulator may induce permanent social effi-
ciency via sustaining a high reputation with myopic agents, there is no interior reputation
level behind which the strategic regulator can hide and induce social efficiency whenever the
long-lived sufficiently patient agent tests the regulator’s reputation every once in a while.
In repeated games with incomplete information and imperfect public monitoring, identi-
fiability is a critical assumption used in the literature. In our paper, these are not satisfied.
The identifiability assumptions we need are the conditional identification properties formal-
ized in Remarks 1 and 2. They suffice and are the key deriving force that results in different
long-run equilibrium behavior for the uninformed players. The conditional identification of
the informed player results in a sharp and long-lasting equilibrium selection effect (in terms
of payoffs and behavior) when the informed player faces a sequence of short-run players.36 On
the other hand, when the uninformed player is also long-lived, the conditional identification
of the uninformed player enables to specify whether a particular behavior of the uninformed
player is attainable in the long-run by easing the complications due to private beliefs (when the
action of the long-lived informed player that makes the agent’s behavior is identifiable in Re-
mark 1 coincides with that of the behavioral type). Insisting on an experimentation/learning
structure on behalf of the uninformed player by making her go for bad behavior now and then
ensures that the conditional identifiability requirements bite. That is, entangling conditional
identifiability and this experimentation structure delivers the stark contrast between the case
with short-lived agents and the case with a long-lived agent.
36We note that Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994)’s sufficiency conditions on the distribution of public
signals that guarantee the Folk theorem result for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring in a
complete-information setting are not satisfied in our paper. The set of all equilibrium payoffs of games
satisfying some version of conditional identification property is an open question to the best of our knowledge.
In our setting, an equilibrium payoff attained in the complete-information game by repeating the stage game
Nash equilibrium is eliminated in the incomplete information setting with short-lived uninformed players.
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Appendix
A The proof of Lemma 1
The utility of the agent being truthful is uA(T, σR) = 0; her expected utility when she is
untruthful is uA(U, σR) = γ[(1− β)g− βl] + (1− γ)σR[(1− β)g− βl] + (1− γ)(1− σR)g. The
agent’s best response correspondence against the strategic regulator’s strategy is:
σA ≡ BRA(σR) =

1 if σR >
g−γβ(g+l)
(1−γ)β(g+l)
[0, 1] if σR =
g−γβ(g+l)
(1−γ)β(g+l)




From this, we can deduce the cutoff prior beliefs. The strategy of the regulator that makes
the agent indifferent between being truthful and untruthful, σR =
g−γβ(g+l)
(1−γ)β(g+l) , is greater than
0 if γ < γ∗ = g
β(g+l)
and equals to 0 if γ = γ∗. If γ > γ∗, then BRA(σR) = 1 for any value of
σR, i.e., even if the strategic regulator is lazy for sure.
The expected utility of the regulator choosing to be diligent is uR(σA, D) = (1− σA)[βd−
(1− β)f ]− c, whereas his expected utility, when he is lazy, is uR(σA, L) = −(1− σA)f . Thus,
the regulator’s best response is given by:
σR ≡ BRR(σA) =

1 if σA < 1− cβ(d+f)
[0, 1] if σA = 1− cβ(d+f)
0 if σA > 1− cβ(d+f) .
(8)
The strategy of the agent that makes the regulator indifferent, σA = 1− cβ(d+f) , is greater than
0 if β > c
f+d
.
Case 1 γ > γ∗: In this case, BRA(σR) = 1 for any σR. The unique fixed point of the best
response correspondences is σA = 1 and σR = 0.
Case 2 γ = γ∗: The strategy that makes the agent indifferent is σR = 0. For σR > 0, BRA(σR) =
1. But, σR > 0 cannot be a best response against σA = 1. Thus, the equilibrium
strategies are σA ∈ [1 − cβ(d+f) , 1] and σR(D) = 0. As we assume that the agent is
truthful for sure when she is indifferent σA = 1 and σR = 0.
Case 3 γ < γ∗: The unique intersection of the best response correspondences in this case is
when σA = 1− cβ(d+f) and σR = g−γβ(g+l)(1−γ)β(g+l) .
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B The proof of Theorem 1
Fix an arbitrary Nash equilibrium in public strategies; each positive probability public history
and posterior belief that are considered are going to be with respect to this Nash equilibrium.
Given an arbitrary Nash equilibrium, for each positive probability public history ht, we let
v(ht) denote the expected continuation value to the strategic regulator starting from ht. If T
has a positive probability under σA,t(h
t) and D has a positive probability under σR,t(h
t), then
v(ht;T,D) ≡ (1− δ)uR(T,D) + δ
∑
id
ρ(id | T,D)v(ht, id).
The definition for v(ht;σA,t(h
t), σR,t(h
t)) is done in the natural way.
The following lemma tells that if there is a positive probability history on which the agent
is truthful with probability one at some date, then the regulator must be lazy with probability
one on that history and date, too.
Lemma 2 Suppose that ht is a positive probability history where σA,t(h
t) = 1 (truthful with
probability one). Then, σR,t(h
t) = 0 (lazy with probability one).
Proof of Lemma 2. Given that the agent chooses σA,t(h
t) = 1 at ht, choosing diligent or
lazy generates the same distribution of public signals so that the continuation payoff v(ht, id)
will be the same. Since the one-period utility uR(T, L) = 0 > uR(T, L) = −c, we conclude
that σR,t(h
t) = 0 complying with the one-shot deviation principle.
This is the consequence of the fact that when the agent is truthful, being lazy and diligent
generates the same distribution of public signals and hence the same continuation payoffs
v(ht, id = 0). The next lemma suggests that there is no date on a positive probability history
on which the regulator is diligent with probability one with respect to a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 3 There is no date t and positive probability history ht at which σR,t(h
t) = 1 (diligent
with probability one). In other words, σR,t(h
t) < 1 for any positive probability ht.
This is because as Lemma 2 says that when the agent is truthful, the regulator chooses
to be lazy. And, the agent chooses to be untruthful with some probability only if she expects
the regulator to be lazy with some probability on a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that there exist a Nash equilibrium with a positive probability
history ht at which σR,t(h
t) = 1. If the agent is truthful with probability one at ht, then the
regulator would have a one-shot deviation gain by switching to lazy since the distribution of
public signals, the posterior belief, and the continuation payoff would not change regardless of
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regulator’s action when the agent is truthful. The agent chooses to be untruthful with some
probability on a Nash equilibrium only when the belief γt−1(ht) at t − 1 is less than γ∗ and
the regulator chooses to be diligent by less than σ¯R =
pi∗−βγ
β(1−γ) < 1.
Lemma 4 Let ht be any positive probability history where γt−1(ht) < γ∗. Then, there exists
some τ ≥ t and hτ that appends after ht for which σR,τ (hτ ) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. Consider an arbitrary public history ht that is reached with positive
probability with respect to some Nash equilibrium. Suppose for a contradiction that for every
τ ≥ t and every hτ that comes after ht, σR,τ (hτ ) = 0 (lazy with probability one at every date
starting from ht). Given γt−1(ht) < γ∗ and there will not be any detections after ht for every
τ ≥ t and history since σR,τ (hτ ) = 0 by hypothesis, and thus the expected probability of
detection is going to be less than pi∗ for every τ ≥ t and hτ . Then, all the myopic agents are
untruthful at every date and history following ht. Thus, the regulator’s expected continuation
payoff becomes v(hτ ) = −f from then on which is less than the minmax payoff −e, providing
us the desired contradiction.
This lemma suggests that every Nash equilibrium continuation path starting from history
ht must include the play of diligence with some probability given that γt−1(ht) < γ∗.
Lemma 5 Suppose that ht is a positive probability history on which detection occurs (id = 1)
at time t given that γ ≡ γt−1(ht) < γ∗. Then, 0 < σR,t(ht) ≤ pi∗−βγβ(1−γ) and the smallest posterior
belief after the detection has been observed denoted by Γ(γ) ≡ γt(ht, id = 1) becomes
Γ(γ) =
γβ
γβ + (1− γ)βσ¯R =
γβ
pi∗
where σ¯R ≡ σ¯R(γ) = pi∗−βγβ(1−γ) .
Proof of Lemma 5. First, note that in order to observe a detection at time t, the agent
must have been untruthful. For the agent to have chosen untruthfulness with some positive
probability at ht, the expected probability of detection must be lower than pi∗. Given that the
belief at the beginning of time t at ht is γ ≡ γt−1(ht) < γ∗, this requires that σR,t(ht) ≤ pi∗−βγβ(1−γ) ,
which is derived from (2). And, σR,t(h
t) must be greater than zero because otherwise there
would not be any detections. Lastly, it is easy to see from expression (3) that the smallest
posterior is obtained when σR,t(h
t) = σ¯R and equals to Γ(γ) =
γβ
pi∗ .
This result is the consequence of the fact that detection is possible only when the agent
is untruthful and the regulator is diligent (with some probability). But, for the agent to be
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untruthful, the strategic regulator should not be diligent more than some specified probability.
Thus, there is an upper bound on the diligence of the regulator for the agent to be untruthful
and the regulator must be using a mixed action at that history. The smallest possible posterior
after detection occurs is calculated with respect to this upper bound.
Proof of Theorem 1. First, note that if the prior belief satisfies γ0 ≥ γ∗, then there is a
unique Nash equilibrium on which the agents are always truthful and the regulator is always
lazy. As all the short-lived agents are truthful with probability one, the reputation for being
tough persists and the equilibrium payoffs are zero both for the strategic regulator and the
short-lived agents.
Now, suppose that γ0 < γ
∗. Again, note that at any positive probability history ht where
γt−1(ht) ≥ γ∗, the agent is truthful and the regulator is lazy from then on. The reputation of
the regulator does not change when the agent is truthful and again it is not optimal for the
strategic regulator to be diligent in this situation. Then, the continuation payoff v(ht) of the
regulator is zero on those histories.
Then, we consider a positive probability history ht for which γ ≡ γt−1(ht) < γ∗ and the
agent is untruthful with some probability (since otherwise, by Lemma 2, the strategic regulator
is lazy and the stage game payoffs are all zero in those periods). This time, the reputation
(posterior belief about the regulator’s type) is updated according to expression (3) as allowed
by Remark 2. Recall that the agent is untruthful only if the expected probability of detection
is pi(γ, σR,t(h
t)) ≤ pi∗, which requires σR,t(ht) to be less than or equal to σ¯R(γ) ≡ pi∗−γβ(1−γ)β .
Then, by Lemma 5, we define the smallest posterior probability of a tough regulator after a




). By Assumption 1, Γ(γ) > γ for
every γ ∈ (0, γ∗), i.e., Γ is strictly increasing and it is continuous.
Following the footsteps of Ely and Va¨lima¨ki (2003), we construct a decreasing sequence
of cutoff beliefs pn such that p1 = γ
∗ and pn = Γ−1(pn−1) for n > 1 and use an induction
on n to bound the payoffs attained in any Nash equilibria when γ exceeds pn. For the
induction hypothesis, suppose that there exists a lower bound Vˆn(δ) with limδ→1 Vˆn(δ) = 0
and Vˆ (γ, δ) ≥ Vˆn(δ) for all γ > pn. Note that this holds for n = 1, i.e., for γ > p1 = γ∗. We
assume this holds for n and want to show that holds for n + 1. Now, fix γ > pn+1. We need
to prove that limδ→1 Vˆn+1(δ) = 0. As the maximum attainable payoff is zero, this will imply
that limδ→1 Vˆ (γ, δ) = 0.
It suffices to consider a Nash equilibrium in which the agent is untruthful in the first period
with some probability, e.g., σA,t(h
t) < 1.37 Since the agent has been untruthful with some
37Take any Nash equilibrium in which the agents have been truthful with probability one until date s > t.
In these periods, the reputation of the regulator will stay the same regardless of her behavior. Thus, it is a
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probability, this implies that the strategic regulator is diligent with no more than σ¯R(γ). Then
this strategy must be a best-reply for the strategic regulator, i.e., the expected long-run payoff
from being lazy should be no less than that of being diligent. Meanwhile, by Lemma 4, for
any positive probability history where γ < γ∗, there exists a continuation history at which the
regulator is diligent with some probability (but not with probability 1 by Lemma 3). Take ht
to be that history at which σR,t(h
t) > 0 (note that this is consistent with σA(h
t) < 1, if the
agent were to be truthful with probability one, by Lemma 2, the regulator would be lazy with
probability 1). Thus, we obtain the following constraint on continuation values at ht:
(1− δ)(−e) + δZD(γ) ≤ (1− δ)(−f) + δZL(γ) ≡ Vˆn+1(δ) (9)
where ZD(γ) and ZL(γ) are the lower bounds on the expected continuation payoffs from
choosing action D and L, respectively.38 And, we can define Vˆn+1(δ) := (1− δ)(−f) + δZL(γ).
When there is no detection, in the worst case senario, the posterior probability drops to
γ− = γ(1−β)
γ(1−β)+(1−γ) at h
t+1 and this happens with probability one when the regulator chooses to
be lazy. Let the minimum continuation payoff for γ− be Vˆ (γ−, δ). Then, ZL(γ) ≡ Vˆ (γ−, δ).
On the other hand, when the strategic regulator chooses to be diligent, there will be detection
with probability β and the posterior probability after a detection occurs is at least Γ(γ), which
is at least pn given γ > pn+1. Hence, we derive the following lower bound on ZD(γ):
βVˆn(δ) + (1− β)Vˆ (γ−, δ) ≤ ZD(γ). (10)
Then, combining (9) and (10) allows us to get:
(1− δ)(−e) + δβVˆn(δ) + δ(1− β)Vˆ (γ−, δ) ≤ (1− δ)(−f) + δVˆ (γ−, δ)
(1− δ)(f − e) + δβVˆn(δ) ≤ δβVˆ (γ−, δ)
which implies that Vˆn(δ) ≤ Vˆ (γ−, δ) since (f − e) > 0.
As Vˆn+1(δ) := (1− δ)(−f) + δZL(γ) = (1− δ)(−f) + δVˆ (γ−, δ) and Vˆn(δ) ≤ Vˆ (γ−, δ), we
conclude that
(1− δ)(−f) + δVˆn(δ) ≤ Vˆn+1(δ). (11)
best response for the regulator to be lazy during these periods. So, her payoff is zero. Then the continuation
play starting from date s is a Nash equilibrium with the same prior γ whose payoff can be no more than the
original game.
38If the agent were to be truthful with probability σA,t(h
t) = 1, choosing lazy is superior to diligent. Thus,
the constraint involves inequality instead of equality.
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By the induction hypothesis, the limit of the left-hand side of (11) is zero as δ approaches to
one. Thus, limδ→1 Vˆn+1(δ) = 0, which implies limδ→1 Vˆ (γ, δ) = 0 as desired for γ ≡ γt−1(ht) <
γ∗. Then, following ht, limδ→1 Vˆ (γ, δ) = 0 for any γ ≡ γt−1(ht) > 0 since the choice of pn
and γ > pn is arbitrary and this holds for every γ ≥ infn pn where (pn)n∈IN is a decreasing
sequence that converges to zero. The regulator gets a payoff possible different than zero only
for finite number of periods up to ht. Thus, we can conclude that limδ→1 Vˆ (γ0, δ) = 0 for any
prior belief γ0 > 0. This completes the proof.
C The proof of Theorem 2
First, we deal with the short-term game and the temporary equilibrium by taking W ∈ C+
as given. Then, the value function in the short-term game when the regulator is diligent and
lazy, respectively, can be given as:















We would like to point out that the regulator is indifferent when WD(γ)−WL(γ) = 0, which
implies that (1−σA)β{(1−δ)(f+d)+δ[W (γ+)−W (γ−)]} = (1−δ)c. If WD(γ) > WL(γ), this
means that the regulator will choose to be diligent, so the expected probability of detection
would be pi(γ) = β for any γ. If, on the other hand, WD(γ) < WL(γ), the regulator will be
lazy for sure, thus the expected probability of detection will be pi(γ) = γβ. Therefore,
Lemma 6 Given W ∈ C+, an equilibrium of the short-term game corresponds to a detection
probability for the regulator as a function of his reputation, pi : [0, 1] → [0, β] (his strategy
then can be deduced from (2)), and an implied strategy for the agent σA(pi) that maximizes the
agent’s problem (1) at pi, with an associated value function W¯ : [0, 1]→ [−f, 0] such that for
any γ ∈ [0, 1],
WD(γ) > WL(γ) implies that pi(γ) = β,
WD(γ) = WL(γ) implies that γβ ≤ pi(γ) ≤ β,
WD(γ) < WL(γ) implies that pi(γ) = γβ,
and W¯ (γ) = max{WD(γ),WL(γ)} where WD(γ),WL(γ) are as in (12) and (13).
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Let us now define, for any given γ and W ,


















where σA(pi) solves the agent’s problem defined in (1) at pi and let
F (σA(pi); γ,W ) ≡ WD(σA(pi); γ,W )−WL(σA(pi); γ,W ) (16)
= (1− σA(pi))β
{













For the subsequent arguments, we would like to remind that γ∗ = g
β(g+l)
and pi∗ = g
g+l
.
Lemma 7 For any γ ∈ [γ∗, 1] and W ∈ C+, pi(σR, γ) ≥ pi∗ for any value of σR. Hence, at the
unique temporary equilibrium of the short-term game, σ¯A(pi) = 1 solves the agent’s problem
in (1), F (σ¯A(pi); γ,W ) = −(1 − δ)c < 0 and W¯ (γ) = max{WD(γ),WL(γ)} = WL(γ) with
σ¯R(γ) = 0. Moreover, γ
+(γ) = γ−(γ) = γ and W¯ (γ) = 0 for any γ ∈ [γ∗, 1].
The proof can be easily shown by employing the definitions, γ∗, pi∗, and using Lemma 6.
Lemma 8 For any γ ∈ [0, γ∗) and W ∈ C+, F (σA(pi); γ,W ) is nonincreasing in pi ∈ [0, β]
and strictly decreasing in σA(pi). Moreover, there exists a unique temporary equilibrium of
the short-term game, given by mixed actions σ¯A(pi
∗) : (γ,W ) → (0, 1) that is continuous in
(γ,W ) and σ¯R(γ) =
pi∗−γβ
(1−γ)β that induces the perceived detection probability pi = pi
∗, which
together satisfy F (σ¯A(pi
∗); γ,W ) = 0 and the agent’s problem in (1). The associated posterior






Proof. Take any γ ∈ [0, γ∗) and W ∈ C+. For pi = 0, the strategy that solves the agent’s
problem in (1) dictates that σA(pi) = 0 and thus F (σA(pi); γ,W ) > 0 by Assumption 2 and
by W being nondecreasing. And, for pi = β, σA(pi) = 1 solves the agent’s problem and the
corresponding F (σA(pi); γ,W ) = −(1 − δ)c < 0. As F > 0 for σA = 0 and F < 0 for σA = 1
and F is continuous and strictly decreasing in σA, there exists unique σ¯A(pi; γ,W ) ∈ (0, 1)
that ensures F (σ¯A(pi); γ,W ) = 0. As F is continuous in (γ,W ) and σ¯A(pi) is unique for a
given (γ,W ); σ¯A(pi; γ,W ) is also continuous in (γ,W ).
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Next, we argue that σ¯A(pi
∗) ∈ (0, 1) and σ¯R(γ) constitute a unique temporary equilibrium.
Suppose for a contradiction that σ¯A(pi) = 0 for some (γ,W ). Then, WD(σ¯A(pi); γ,W ) >
WL(σ¯A(pi); γ,W ) and σ¯R(γ) = 1. But, this implies that the perceived probability of detection
is β and thus σ¯A(pi) = 0 does not solve the agent’s problem in (1). Suppose on the contrary
that σ¯A(pi) = 1 for some (γ,W ). Then WL(σ¯A(pi); γ,W ) > WD(σ¯A(pi); γ,W ) and σ¯R(γ) = 0,
which suggests that pi = γβ, and in turn would imply σ¯A(pi; γ,W ) = 0 as γ < γ
∗. Hence, we
conclude that σ¯A(pi
∗; γ,W ) ∈ (0, 1) and σ¯R(γ) = pi∗−γβ(1−γ)β is the unique temporary equilibrium,
since for σ¯A(pi) to be a completely mixed strategy, the detection probability must be set to
pi∗ by the regulator employing the strategy σ¯R(γ) =
pi∗−γβ
(1−γ)β . Lastly, the associated posterior
beliefs are calculated from (3) by using Bayes’ rule.
From hereafter, we refer to the temporary equilibrium strategy of the agent for a givenW as
σ∗A(γ,W ) and that of the regulator as σ
∗
R(γ) and define W¯ (γ,W ) := WD(σ
∗
A(γ,W ); γ,W ) =
WL(σ
∗
A(γ,W ); γ,W ) as the value function evaluated at the temporary equilibrium of the
short-term game for γ < γ∗. We want to show that W¯ is continuous and nondecreasing in γ,
which depend on the behavior of σ∗A(γ,W ) as well as W .
39 As the value of W changes (in a
nondecreasing way) with a change in γ, we should consider both of the arguments of W¯ to
investigate whether it is nondecreasing in γ or not.
Lemma 9 W¯ (γ,W ) is continuous and nondecreasing in γ for any W ∈ C+.
Proof. As at σ∗A(γ,W ), F (σ
∗
A(γ,W ); γ,W ) = 0, both (i) W¯ (γ,W ) = WD(σ
∗
A(γ,W ); γ,W )
and (ii) W¯ (γ,W ) = WL(σ
∗
A(γ,W ); γ,W ) are true. Note that (ii) implies,
W¯ (γ,W ) = −(1− δ)(1− σ∗A(γ,W ))f + δW (γ−(γ)) + δσ∗A(γ,W )
[
W (γ)−W (γ−(γ))] . (17)
Multiplying (ii) by 1 − β > 0 and then subtracting this from (i) result in the following
expression for W¯ (γ,W ):
W¯ (γ,W ) = (1− δ)(1− σ∗A(γ,W ))d− (1− δ)cβ + δW (γ+(γ))− δσ∗A(γ,W ) [W (γ+(γ))−W (γ)] .(18)
For any (γ1,W1) ≤ (γ2,W2); if σ∗A(γ2,W2) ≥ σ∗A(γ1,W1), expression (17) implies that W¯ is non-
decreasing in (γ,W ). This is because, σ∗A(γ,W ) ∈ (0, 1) is assumed to be nondecreasing and W
is nondecreasing in γ. As [W (γ)−W (γ−)] ≥ 0 for any W1,W2 and γ1, γ2, the right-hand side
of (17) is nondecreasing. Hence, W¯ (γ2,W2) ≥ W¯ (γ1,W1) when (γ2,W2) ≥ (γ1,W1). If, on the
other hand, we suppose that σ∗A(γ2,W2) < σ
∗
A(γ1,W1), then expression (18) will imply that W¯
39We would like to remind that W¯ is constant at zero for γ ≥ γ∗ for any W ∈ C+, thus it is continuous and
nondecreasing at these values.
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is nondecreasing. To see that, as this time, σ∗A(γ,W ) is assumed to be nonincreasing in γ and
[W (γ+)−W (γ)] ≥ 0 for any W1,W2 and γ1, γ2 as before, the right-hand side of (18) is nonde-
creasing which implies W¯ (γ2,W2) ≥ W¯ (γ1,W1) when (γ2,W2) ≥ (γ1,W1). Consequently, W¯
is nondecreasing in (γ,W ) (whether σ∗A(γ2,W2) ≥ σ∗A(γ1,W1) or σ∗A(γ2,W2) < σ∗A(γ1,W1)).
The continuity of W¯ in (γ,W ) is a direct implication of the continuity of σ∗A (γ,W ), which
is established by Lemma 8, and W ∈ C+.
Now, we can redefine the operator that maps the next period’s continuation value to today’s
with the equilibrium outcome of the short-term game as T (W ) : γ ∈ [0, 1] → W¯ (γ,W ). The
last step is to argue that T is a contraction that maps continuous and nondecreasing functions
on [0, 1] into itself. Lemma 9 shows that the operator T defined above maps C+ into C+.
Moreover, T (W + k) = T (W ) + δk for any constant k. Then, by Blackwell’s theorem, T is a
contraction mapping on a complete metric space (C+ with the sup norm); and hence, it has a
unique fixed point V . Finally, the equilibrium strategies and the value function V of Theorem
2 follow from Lemmas 7 and 8.
C.1 The proof of Corollary 1
Let the belief at the beginning of τ be γ ≡ γτ−1, the posterior probability when the regulator
chooses σ∗R(γ) =
pi∗−γβ
(1−γ)β is derived from (3) and equals to
γβ
pi∗ > γ upon observing a detection.
After k consecutive detections starting at τ , we obtain γτ−1+k = γτ−1(
β
pi∗ )
k. Since detection is
possible only when agent chooses U , which needs the posterior beliefs to be less than γ∗:
γτ−1+k ≤ γ∗ ⇒ γτ−1( β
pi∗
)k ≤ γ∗ which implies k ≤ log(γ
∗)− log(γ)
log(β)− log(pi∗) .
D The proof of Theorem 3
The commitment strategy of the tough regulator, σˆR, is simple (it is a constant function) and
thus it is public.40 Also, note that the agent’s best response to σˆR, denoted by σˆA, is the
regulator-preferred strategy as it involves a play of truthful action T with probability one in
every period after every history (hence, it is also public). On the other hand, for the strategic
regulator, σˆR is not a best response to the agent’s best response to the commitment strategy
σˆA; thus, it is not credible. The strategies σˆR and σˆA satisfy the conditions in Definition
5.1 and 5.2 of Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2007), which state that the commitment
strategy of the regulator has no long-run credibility and long-lived agent’s best response to
the commitment strategy is unique on the equilibrium path.
40A behavior strategy is public if it is measurable with respect to the filtration induced by the public signals,
{Ht}∞t=0.
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Theorem 3 involves Nash equilibria constrained as follows: a given an arbitrarily small
α > 0, an α-Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium with min{1− σ˜At, σ˜At} ≥ α for all t ∈ N.
The agent’s beliefs about her own future behavior
The following lemma shows that if there is a set of states with a positive measure on which the
agent plays truthfully with a very high probability in the long-run in an α-Nash equilibrium,
then, given any one of her private histories, there must be a subset of these states such that
there is a period after which the agent plays truthfully on average almost all the time in any
continuation game from that period onward.
Lemma 10 Suppose that there exists A ⊂ Ω with Q˜(A) > 0 such that for all ω ∈ A,
limt→∞ ‖σˆA − E˜[σ˜At | HAt]‖ = α given an α-Nash equilibrium (σ˜A, σ˜R), for some arbitrar-
ily small α > 0. Then, there exists F ⊂ A with Q˜(F) > 0 such that, for any ξ > α, there





‖σˆA − E˜[σ˜At′ | HAt′ ]‖ | HAt
]
< ξ, ∀t ≥ t¯α (19)





‖σˆA − E˜[σ˜At′ | HAt′ ]‖ < ψ | HAt
)→ 1, ∀t ≥ t¯α (20)
where the convergence is uniform on F .
Proof. By hypothesis, ‖σˆA − E˜[σ˜At | HAt]‖ converges Q˜-almost surely to α on A. So, the
random variables Zt := supt′>t ‖σˆA − E˜[σ˜At′ | HAt′ ]‖ also converge Q˜-almost surely to α on
A. Thus, on A, E˜[Zt | HAt] → α, Q˜-almost surely (by Lemma 4.24 Hart (1985)). Egorov’s
Theorem (Chung (1974)) then suggests that there exists F ⊂ A with Q˜(F) > 0 on which the
convergence of E˜[Zt | HAt] is uniform. This implies that, for any ξ > α, there exists t¯α such
that on F ,




‖σˆA − E˜[σ˜At′ | HAt′ ]‖ | HAt
]
< ξ, ∀t ≥ t¯.
Finally, the last expression in Lemma 10 follows from Chebyshev-Markov inequality. Fix
ψ > 0 so that ξ = ψ for some  > 0. Since Zt has a finite mean and Zt ≥ α, Q˜(Zt ≥ ψ |
HAt) ≤ E˜[Zt|HAt]ψ < ξψ . As ψ > 0 and ξ = ψ, we obtain Q˜(Zt ≥ ψ) < , which indicates that
Q˜(α ≤ Zt < ψ | HAt) > 1−  for all t > t¯α on F . This implies (20).
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The agent’s beliefs about the regulator’s future behavior
The next lemma states that if there is a set of states with a positive measure on which the
agent plays truthfully with very high probability on average in every continuation game after
some period (which is the unique best reply to the commitment strategy), then she must be
convinced to see the commitment action D in every continuation game from then on with a
high probability. The intuition for this relies on the uniqueness of the best response of the
agent against the regulator’s repeated strategy of playing D (i.e., the commitment strategy).
Lemma 11 Suppose that there exists F ⊂ Ω with Q˜(F) > 0 such that, for any ξ > 0 and
ψ > 0, there exists t¯α for which (19) and (20) stated in Lemma 10 hold for all ω ∈ F for a





‖σˆR − E[σ˜Rt′ | HAt′ ]‖ < ζα | HAt
)
> 1− ζα, ∀t ≥ t¯α (21)
for all ω ∈ F .
Proof. Let Zt := supt′>t ‖σˆA − E˜[σ˜At′ | HAt′ ]‖ and (19) and (20) hold by the hypothesis. For
any  > 0 (so that ξ = ψ as given in Lemma 10), Q˜(Zt < ψ | HAt) > 1 −  for all t > t¯α
on F . This means that the agent chooses the strategy that is the unique best response to
the commitment strategy of the regulator with a very high probability not only in the current
periods but in every continuation game after t > t¯α on F on the given α-Nash equilibrium.
Fix some s > 0 and a private history hAt, where hAt¯α is the initial segment of hAt, in F .
Since the agent is discounting (one can identify δα ∈ (0, 1) such that for all discount factors
strictly exceeding δα), there exists s
′ > s and ζ > 0 such that for all t′ = t, ..., t + s′ and
hAt′ for which ‖σˆR − E[σ˜Rt′ | hAt′ ]‖ < ζ, the continuation strategy σ˜A of the agent (after
the initial history hAt¯) agrees with σˆA ≡ BRA(σˆR) for the next s periods. In other words, if
the agent expects to see D with a very high probability for s′ number of periods after some
private history, then he would be playing T with a very high probability for s periods. Since
by hypothesis, σ˜A agrees with σˆA for every t
′ > t and for all t ≥ t¯α, ‖σˆR − E[σ˜Rt′ | hAt′ ]‖ < ζ





‖σˆR − E[σ˜Rt′ | HAt′ ]‖ < ζ | HAt
)
> 1− ζ, ∀t ≥ t¯α. (22)
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The regulator’s beliefs about the agent’s behavior (given a particular history)
Next step shows that the regulator eventually becomes convinced that the agent plays a
best response to the commitment strategy (i.e., T ) in the continuation game on a class of
private histories that involve the successive play of D. To become convinced about the agent’s
behavior and beliefs, he does not need to know her private history when he has been diligent.
To prove this result, we follow the footsteps of Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2007,
Lemma 3); let the σ-algebra of the regulator who has played D up to (and not including)
period s be HˆRs. Then, regulator’s information set at time s (given this particular filtration
of private histories) if he were to know the private history of the agent at time t can be
described by ϕ(HˆRs,HAt), the smallest σ-algebra containing the σ-algebras HˆRs and HAt.
Lemma 12 For any given α-Nash equilibrium (σ˜A, σ˜R) with α > 0 arbitrarily small and for
any t > 0 and τ ≥ 0,
lim
s→∞
∥∥E˜[σ˜A,s+τ | ϕ(HˆRs,HAt)]− E˜[σ˜A,s+τ | HˆRs]∥∥ = 0, Q˜− a.s.
Proof. We prove for τ = 0. The case of τ ≥ 1 can be proven by induction and making the
appropriate modifications in the proof of Lemma 3 of Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2007)
provided in Appendix A.3. Suppose that K ⊂ At is a set of t-period agent action profiles
(a0, a1, ..., at−1), which also denotes the corresponding event. By Bayes’ rule, we can derive
the conditional probability of the event K given that the regulator has played diligent D, i.e.,
after the private history hˆR,s+1 ≡ (hˆRs, D, id) with id ∈ Id, as follows:
Q˜[K | hˆR,s+1] = Q˜[K | hˆRs, D, id] = Q˜[K | hˆRs]Q˜[D, id | K, hˆRs]




a∈A ρ(id | a,D)E˜[σ˜aA(hAs) | K, hˆRs]∑
a∈A ρ(id | a,D)E˜[σ˜aA(hAs) | hˆRs]
.
Now, we subtract Q˜[K | hˆRs] from both sides of the above equation to get




a∈A ρ(id | a,D)
(
E˜[σ˜aA(hAs) | K, hˆRs]− E˜[σ˜aA(hAs) | hˆRs]
)
∑
a∈A ρ(id | a,D)E˜[σ˜aA(hAs) | hˆRs]
.
Note that the term
∑
a∈A ρ(id | a,D)E˜[σ˜aA(hAs) | hˆRs] (equals βE˜[σ˜UA(hAs) | hˆRs] when id = 0
and E˜[σ˜UA(hAs) | hˆRs](1 − β) + E˜[σ˜TA(hAs) | hˆRs] ∗ 1 when id = 1) is strictly positive and less
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than or equal to one by assumption, for any given id ∈ Id. Hence,
∣∣Q˜[K | hˆR,s+1] − Q˜[K | hˆRs]∣∣





E˜[σ˜aA(hAs) | K, hˆRs]− E˜[σ˜aA(hAs) | hˆRs]
)∣∣∣∣.
As each of the random variables {Q˜[K | HˆRs]}s is a martingale with respect to ({HˆRs}s, Q˜),
it converges to a non-negative limit as s → ∞. Thus, the LHS of the above inequality goes







E˜[σ˜A(hAs) | K, hˆRs]− E˜[σ˜A(hAs) | hˆRs] =
(
E˜[σ˜TA(hAs) | K, hˆRs]− E˜[σ˜TA(hAs) | hˆRs]
E˜[σ˜UA(hAs) | K, hˆRs]− E˜[σ˜UA(hAs) | hˆRs]
)
.
to rewrite the RHS as
Q˜[K | HˆRs]
∥∥∥∥ΠA,Id · (E˜[σ˜A(hAs) | K, hˆRs]− E˜[σ˜A(hAs) | hˆRs])∥∥∥∥.
As there exists a strictly positive constant x such that∥∥∥∥ΠA,Id · (E˜[σ˜A(hAs) | K, hˆRs]− E˜[σ˜A(hAs) | hˆRs])∥∥∥∥
≥ x





∥∥∥∥E˜[σ˜A(hAs) | K, hˆRs]− E˜[σ˜A(hAs) | hˆRs]∥∥∥∥ = 0
Q˜-a.s on K, where ϕ(HˆRs, K) is the smallest σ-algebra containing the σ-algebra HˆRs and
event K. Since, Q˜[K | HˆR∞](ω) ≥ Q˜[K | HˆRs](ω) > 0 for all s > t for Q˜-almost all ω ∈ K,
lim
s→∞
∥∥∥∥E˜[σ˜As | ϕ(HˆRs, K)]− E˜[σ˜As | HˆRs]∥∥∥∥ = 0
Q˜-a.s on K. Since this is true for all K ∈ HAt, we obtain
lim
s→∞
∥∥∥∥E˜[σ˜As | ϕ(HˆRs,HAt)]− E˜[σ˜As | HˆRs]∥∥∥∥ = 0
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Q˜− a.s., proving the desired result for τ = 0.
The agent’s beliefs about her own future behavior – revisited
The next result establishes that for any given α-Nash equilibrium with α > 0, there exists a
time period tˆα such that in any history following that period, the agent expects the strategic
regulator to be diligent (i.e., choose D) with a high probability.
In what follows, we restrict attention to histories in which the agent chooses U and by
abusing notation denote the resulting filtration by HAt.
Note that the reputation of the regulator does not change if the realization of the agent’s
completely mixed strategy is T in a given α-Nash equilibrium with α > 0. Moreover, the agent
plays U with at least α probability in any given private history of the agent. Thus, if there
exists an event (denoted by ω ∈ F as in Lemma 10) such that the strategic regulator plays
lazy L with some strictly positive probability in every continuation game after any period t,
then considering histories in which the agent plays U (on account of being constrained by
α-Nash concerns) along with R’s identification condition, Remark 2, empower us to employ
the merging argument of Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2007). In these histories, in which
the strategic regulator’s behavior does not converge to playing D with a high probability, his
true type is going to be revealed to the agent in the long run.41 But, such histories would be
in contradiction with (21) of Lemma 11. And this makes us obtain the following:
Lemma 13 Suppose that (21) given in Lemma 11 is satisfied for all ω ∈ F for a given α-
Nash equilibrium (σ˜A, σ˜R) with α > 0 arbitrarily small. Then, there exists tˆα such that the





‖σˆR − E˜[σ˜Rt′ | HAt′ ]‖ < ν | HAt
)
> 1− ν, ∀t ≥ tˆα. (23)
The proof of this result, sketched above, employs the same arguments used for purposes
of identification as in the proof of Lemma 12 in line with the merging argument of Cripps,
Mailath, and Samuelson (2007), and hence, is omitted.
By Lemma 10, for any given α-Nash equilibrium (σ˜A, σ˜R) with α > 0 there is a time
t¯α after which the agent assigns very high probability to the event that all her continuation
41Note that the agent uses the information gathered along her private history while updating her beliefs
about the regulator’s type. The agent’s posterior belief at time t (that the regulator is tough) is given by the
HAt - measurable random variable γt ≡ Q(tough | HAt) : Ω → [0, 1]. At any equilibrium, γt is a bounded
martingale with respect to {HAt}t and measure Q. Therefore, γt converges Q-almost surely to a random
variable γ∞. Since Q˜ is absolutely continuous with respect to Q, any statement that holds Q-almost surely
also holds Q˜ - almost surely. Thus, γt also converges to Q˜ - almost surely to a random variable γ∞.
40
strategies from then on are best replies to the commitment strategy of the regulator (given
that the conditions of the lemma are met). And thus, by Lemmas 11 and 13, the agent must be
believing that she is going to see the diligent behavior D with a high probability from then on
in every continuation game. Lemma 12 states that these beliefs of the agent about her future
behavior will eventually be known by the regulator (even if he cannot observe the agent’s
private history) given that he has indeed been playing diligently with a high probability (as
expected by the agent).
The agent’s beliefs about the regulator’s future behavior – revisited
To prove Theorem 3 with a contradiction, we suppose that there exists A ∈ Ω with Q˜(A) > 0
such that for all ω ∈ A, limt→∞ ‖σˆA−E˜[σ˜At | HAt]‖ = α given an α-Nash equilibrium (σ˜A, σ˜R)
with α > 0 but arbitrarily small. Then, by Lemma 10, there exists F ⊂ A with Q˜(F) > 0
such that, there exists t¯α for which the agent assigns very high probability to the event that
all her continuation strategies from then on are best replies to the commitment strategy of the
regulator. For this to be optimal for the agent, Lemmas 11 and 13 establish that the agent
believes that the strategic regulator is going to be diligent from t ≥ max{t¯α, tˆα} on in every
continuation game with a very high probability on F . Lemma 12 states that these beliefs of
the agent about her future behavior will eventually be known to the strategic regulator who is
indeed diligent with a high probability (as expected by the agent). But, if the strategic type
of the regulator eventually expects the agent to always give a best reply to the commitment
strategy of the regulator in every continuation game, then the regulator would like to deviate
from the commitment strategy D as it is noncredible, i.e., not a best response to the best
response of the agent to the commitment strategy. Now, there seems to be a contradiction with
agent’s beliefs about the strategic regulator’s behavior (Lemma 13) on F and the regulator’s
behavior on a set G (to be explained below) where the regulator expects to see the agent give
a best response to the commitment strategy D and is expected to play D. But, one needs to
establish that G is a subset of F and also measurable for the agent. Instead, following Cripps,
Mailath, and Samuelson (2007), we show that G is close to a HAs - measurable set on which
the agent believes that all her future behavior is going to be a best response (restricted by α)
to the commitment strategy of the regulator.
Lemma 14 Let (σ˜A, σ˜R) be any given α-Nash equilibrium with α > 0 and sufficiently small
and suppose that F is the positive probability set of events stated in Lemmas 10 and 11; and
ν > 0 be the constant in Lemma 13. For any ξ > α (as in Lemma 10 given α and F) and
number of periods τ , there exists an event G and a time T (ξ, τ) such that for all s > T (ξ, τ),
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there exists Cs ∈ HAs and φ > 0 with
‖σˆR − E˜[σ˜Rs | HAs]‖ < ν, Q˜− a.s. on Cs (24)
G ∪ F ⊂ Cs and Q˜(G) > Q˜(Cs)− φQ˜(F), (25)
and, on G, for any s′ = {s, s+ 1, ..., s+ τ}
E˜[σˆAs′ | HˆRs] > 1− 2
√
ξ. (26)
Proof. The proof uses arguments in Lemma 12 and modified version of Lemma 4 of Cripps,
Mailath, and Samuelson (2007).
Fix τ > 0. Take ξ > α let t¯α denote the threshold period stated in Lemma 10 for this ξ and
notice that the resulting set of events F is such that Q˜(F) tends to one as t ≥ t¯α increases.
Thus, there exists x < 1/5 such that ξ ∈ (α, (x Q˜(F))2). Regulator’s minimum estimate on
the probability of truthfulness over periods s, ..., s+ τ when his private history indicates HˆRs
can be expressed as fs ≡ mins≤s′≤s+τ E˜[σ˜As′(T ) | HˆRs] where T denotes the truthful action.
Note that fs > 1− 2
√
ξ is sufficient to show (26). The first step is to find a lower bound for
fs. For any t ≤ s, the triangle inequality implies
min
s≤s′≤s+τ
E˜[σ˜As′(T ) | ϕ(HˆRs,HAt)]− kts ≤ fs ≤ 1
where kts ≡ maxs≤s′≤s+τ
∣∣E˜[σ˜As′(T ) | ϕ(HˆRs,HAt)] − E˜[σ˜As′(T ) | HˆRs]∣∣ for t ≤ s. By Lemma
12, lims→∞ kts = 0, Q˜ - a.s. Let G0t ≡ {ω : σ˜As(hAs) = 1− α, ∀s ≥ t}. Then,
fs ≥ Q˜
(G0t | ϕ(HˆRs,HAt))− kts.
The sequence of random variables {Q˜(G0t | ϕ(HˆRs,HAt))}s is a martingale with respect to the
filtration {HˆRs}, so it converges almost surely to gt ≡ Q˜(G0t | ϕ(HˆR∞,HAt)). Hence,
1 ≥ fs ≥ gt − kts − lts (27)
where lts ≡ |gt − Q˜(G0t | ϕ(HˆRs,HAt))| and lims→∞ lts = 0, Q˜ - a.s.
The second step involves finding the sets Cs and an intermediate set (to be denoted by
F∗) that is used to determine the set G. First, for any t ≥ max{t¯α, tˆα} ≡ tα (the critical
periods from Lemmas 10 and 11 and Lemma 13), using condition (19) of Lemma 10 implying
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condition (23) of Lemma 13, we define the associated events
Kt ≡ {ω : Q˜(G0t | HAt) > 1− ξ, ‖σˆR − E˜[σ˜Rt | HAt]‖ < ν} ∈ HAt.
Let F st ≡
⋂s
τ=tKτ and Ft ≡
⋂∞








By Lemmas 10, 11, and 13, F ⊂ Kt for all t ≥ tα; thus, F ⊂ F st , F ⊂ Ft and F ⊂ lim inf Kt.
Also define Nt ≡ {ω : gt ≥ 1 −
√
ξ}, the measure of events that the strategic regulator
expects the agent to play T with probability 1− α exceeds 1−√ξ. Set Cs ≡ F stα ∈ HAt and
define an intermediate set F∗ by F∗ ≡ Ftα ∩Ntα . Since Cs ⊂ Ks, (24) holds (by Lemmas 10 -
13). And, as F∗ ∪F ⊂ Cs, the first part of (25) holds with F∗ in the role of G. By definition,
Q˜(Cs)− Q˜(F∗) = Q˜(Cs ∩ (Ftα ∩Ntα)C) = Q˜
(
(Cs ∩ (Ftα)C) ∪ (Cs ∩ (Ntα)C)
)
where the complement of a set X is denoted by (X)C. Since the event Cs ∩ (Ntα)C is a subset
of Ktα ∩ (Ntα)C, we have
Q˜(Cs)− Q˜(F∗) ≤ Q˜(Cs ∩ (Ftα)C) + Q˜(Ktα ∩ (Ntα)C). (28)
Next, we find the upper bounds for the two terms on the right hand side of (28).
First, note that Q˜(Cs ∩ (Ftα)C) = Q˜(F stα)− Q˜(Ftα) by definition. Since lims→∞ Q˜(F stα) =
Q˜(Ftα), there exists T ′ ≥ tα such that
Q˜(Cs ∩ (Ftα)C) <
√
ξ ∀s ≥ T ′. (29)
Also, as Q˜(G0t | Kt) > 1 − ξ and Kt ∈ HAt, iterated expectations imply that 1 − ξ < Q˜(G0t |
Kt) = E˜[gt | Kt]. Since gt ≤ 1, one gets
1− ξ < E˜[gt | Kt] ≤ (1−
√
ξ) Q˜((Nt)C | Kt) + Q˜(Nt | Kt)
= 1−
√
ξ Q˜((Nt)C | Kt).
This implies that Q˜((Nt)C | Kt) <
√
ξ. By taking t = tα, we get
Q˜(Ktα ∩ (Ntα)C) <
√
ξ. (30)
Using (29) and (30) in (28), Q˜(Cs)− Q˜(F∗) < 2
√
ξ for all s ≥ T ′. Given that F ⊂ Cs and
the bound on ξ, Q˜(F∗) > Q˜(F)− 2√ξ > (1− 2x)Q˜(F) > 0.
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Let T (ξ, τ) ≡ max{T ′, T ′′}. Since G ∪ F ⊂ F∗ ∪ F ⊂ Cs, the first part of (25) holds.
Now, we use the two steps to obtain G and the bound on fs. As Q˜(F∗) > 0 and ktαs +
ltαs converges almost surely to zero; by Egorov’s Theorem, there exists G ⊂ F∗ such that
Q˜(F∗ \ G) < √ξ and T ′′ > tα such that ktαs + ltαs <
√
ξ on G for all s ≥ T ′′. Therefore,
Q˜(G) > Q˜(F∗) −√ξ and as Q˜(F∗) > Q˜(F) − 2√ξ we see that Q˜(G) > Q˜(F) − 3√ξ and as
ξ < (xQ˜(F))2 we obtain Q˜(G) > (1− 3x)Q˜(F). Now, as there is φ such that φQ˜(F) > Q˜(F∗)
with φ > 1 − 2x we have that Q˜(Cs) − φQ˜(F) < Q˜(Cs) − Q˜(F∗) < 2
√
ξ < 2xQ˜(F) and we
wish to obtain that 2xQ˜(F) < (1 − 3x)Q˜(F). Thus, because that x ∈ (0, 1/5) we see that
Q˜(G) > (1 − 3x)Q˜(F) and Q˜(Cs) − φQ˜(F) < 2xQ˜(F) is satisfied. Thus, the second part of
(25) holds for all s > T (ξ, τ). And, notice that gtα ≥ 1−√ξ on G since G ⊂ Ntα . Thus, on G,
fs > 1− 2
√
ξ for all s > T (ζ, τ) by (27). This with the bound on ξ gives (26) and completes
the proof.
Next, we will establish that on the set G the strategic type of the regulator will not find
it optimal to play the commitment strategy. This will make the agent’s expectation of the
strategic regulator’s action move away from the commitment strategy on F through the rela-
tions established between the sets G, F and Cs in Lemma 14. And, this will contradict with
the expectations on HAs - measurable set F stated in Lemmas 10, 11, and 13.
The proof of Theorem 3
Let (ςR, ςA) be the stage game strategy profile that puts probability one on the commitment
action D and the best response to the commitment action T . Note that when the agent uses
any strategy that sufficiently close to ςA, say at most v¯ distant to ςA, playing ςR is suboptimal
by at least µ > 0. Then, for a given discount factor δ, there exists a sufficiently large τ such
that the loss of µ for one period is larger than any potential gain hold off on for τ periods.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose that there exists A ∈ Ω with Q˜(A) > 0 such that for all
ω ∈ A, limt→∞ ‖σˆA− E˜[σ˜At | HAt]‖ = α for the given α-Nash equilibrium (σ˜A, σ˜R) with α > 0
and α sufficiently small. Then, fix F from Lemma 10 with ξ > α and t∗α = max{t¯α, tˆα, T (ξ, τ)}
(as specified in Lemmas 10 – 14). For ξ < v¯ and τ , let G and Cs be the events described in
Lemma 14 for s > T (ξ, τ). Consider the period s > T (ξ, τ) at some state in G. By (26), the
regulator, who would be playing D, expects to see a strategy within 2
√
ξ of ςA for the next τ
periods where ξ < v¯ (by choosing ξ sufficiently small which is feasible as α > 0 is sufficiently
small, one can ensure that 2
√
ξ < v¯). Playing ςR is suboptimal in period s since the most he
can gain from playing D is less than playing a best response to ςA for τ periods. Thus, on G,
the strategic type of the regulator would like to play D with zero probability, which essentially
is a contradiction. And, to get a contradiction in agent’s beliefs, we calculate a lower bound
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on the difference between ςR and the agent’s beliefs about the strategic type playing action D
in period s, E˜[σ˜Rs(D) | HAs] on the events in Cs (that contains F where the agent is truthful
after t > t∗α):
E˜
[∣∣ςR − E˜[σ˜Rs(D) | HAs]∣∣1Cs] ≥ E˜[(ςR − E˜[σ˜Rs(D) | HAs])1Cs]







The first inequality is just removing the absolute values. The second inequality applies
ςR(D) = 1 and uses the HAs - measurability of Cs. The third is the result of σ˜Rs(D) = 0
on G and σ˜Rs(D) ≤ 1 in the rest of the set with G ⊂ Cs ∈ HAs. The third and fourth fol-
lows from (25) in Lemma 14. Finally, the last one is by F ⊂ Cs. Since E˜
[∣∣ςR − E˜[σ˜Rs(D) |
HAs]
∣∣1Cs] > (1−φ)Q˜(F) for all s > t∗α and, by Lemma 13, on Cs, E˜[|ςR−E˜[σ˜Rs | HAs]|1Cs ] < ν,
we obtain the desired contradiction and hence concluding the proof.
45
References
Al-Najjar, N. I. (1995): “Decomposition and Characterization of Risk with a Continuum
of Random Variables,” Econometrica, 63(5), 1195–1224.
Aoyagi, M. (1996): “Reputation and Dynamic Stackelberg Leadership in Infinitely Repeated
Games,” Journal of Economic Theory, 71, 378–393.
Atakan, A. E., and M. Ekmekci (2012): “Reputation in Long-Run Relationships,” The
Review of Economic Studies, 79(2), 451–480.
(2015): “Reputation in the Long-Run with Imperfect Monitoring,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 157, 553–605.
Barlo, M., G. Carmona, and H. Sabourian (2016): “Bounded Memory Folk Theorem,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 163, 728–774.
Benabou, R., and G. Laroque (1992): “Using Privileged Information to Manipulate
Markets: Insiders, Gurus and Credibility,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(3), 921–
958.
Board, S., and M. Meyer-ter Vehn (2013): “Reputation for Quality,” Econometrica,
81(6), 2381–2462.
Celentani, M., D. Fudenberg, D. K. Levine, and W. Pesendorfer (1996): “Main-
taining A Reputation Against A Long-Lived Opponent,” Econometrica, 64(3), 691–704.
Chan, J. (2000): “On the Non-Existence of Reputation Effects in Two-person Infinitely
Repeated Games,” Working paper.
Chung, K. L. (1974): A Course in Probability Theory. New York: Academic Press.
Cripps, M., E. Dekel, and W. Pesendorfer (2005): “Reputation with Equal Discount-
ing in Repeated Games with Strictly Conflicting Interests,” Journal of Economic Theory,
121, 259–272.
Cripps, M. W., G. J. Mailath, and L. Samuelson (2004): “Imperfect Monitoring and
Impermanent Reputations,” Econometrica, 72(2), 407–432.
(2007): “Disappering Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 134, 287–316.
Dilme´, F. (2019): “Reputation Building through Costly Adjustment,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 181, 586–626.
Dorigo, M. (1992): “Optimization, Learning and Natural Algorithms,” PhD Thesis, Po-
litecnico di Milano.
Ekmekci, M. (2011): “Sustainable Reputations with Rating Systems,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 146, 479–503.
46
Ekmekci, M., O. Gossner, and A. Wilson (2012): “Impermanent Types and Permanent
Reputations,” Journal of Economic Theory, 147, 162 – 178.
Ely, J. C., D. Fudenberg, and D. K. Levine (2008): “When is Reputation Bad?,”
Games and Economic Behavior, 63, 498 – 526.
Ely, J. C., and J. Va¨lima¨ki (2003): “Bad Reputation,” The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 118(3), 785 – 814.
Fudenberg, D., and D. K. Levine (1989): “Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in
Games with a Patient Player,” Econometrica, 57(4), 759–778.
(1992): “Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed,”
Review of Economic Studies, 59, 561–579.
Fudenberg, D., D. K. Levine, and E. Maskin (1994): “The Folk Theorem with Imper-
fect Public Information,” Econometrica, 62(5), 997–1039.
Gale, D., and R. Rosenthal (1994): “Price and Quality Cycles for Experience Goods,”
The RAND Journal of Economics, 25, 590–607.
Gossner, O. (2011): “Simple Bounds on the Value of Reputation,” Econometrica, 79(5),
1627–1641.
Halac, M., and A. Prat (2016): “Managerial Attention and Worker Performance,” Amer-
ican Economic Review, 106(10), 3104–32.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1967-68): “Games of Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players,
Parts I-III,” Management Science, 14(3), 159–182.
Hart, S. (1985): “Nonzero-Sum Two Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information,”
Mathematics of Operations Research, 10, 117–153.
Holmstro¨m, B. (1999): “Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective,” Review
of Economic Studies, 66, 169–182.
Kreps, D., and R. Wilson (1982): “Sequential Equilibria,” Econometrica, 50, 863 – 894.
Liu, Q. (2011): “Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics,” Review of Economic
Studies, 78, 1400–1425.
Liu, Q., and A. Skrzypacz (2014): “Limited Records and Reputation Bubbles,” Journal
of Economic Theory, 151, 2–29.
Mailath, G. J., and L. Samuelson (2001): “Who Wants a Good Reputation?,” Review
of Economic Studies, 68, 415–441.
(2006): Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships. Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford.
47
(2015): “Chapter 4: Reputations in Repeated Games,” in Handbook of Game Theory,
Volume 4, ed. by P. Young, and S. Zamir. Elsevier Science Publishers.
Marinovic, I., A. Skrzypacz, and F. Varas (2018): “Dynamic Certification and Repu-
tation for Quality,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 10(2), 58–82.
Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts (1982): “Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 280 – 312.
Monte, D. (2013): “Bounded Memory and Permanent Reputations,” Journal of Mathemat-
ical Economics, 49, 345–354.
O¨zdog˜an, A. (2014): “Disappearance of Reputations in Two-Sided Incomplete-Information
Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 88, 211–220.
(2016): “Occurrence of Deception under the Oversight of a Regulator Having Repu-
tation Concerns,” in Recent Advances in Game Theory and Applications, European Meeting
on Game Theory, Saint Petersburg, Russia, 2015 and Networking Games and Management,
Petrozavodsk, Russia, 2015, ed. by L. A. Petrosyan, and V. V. Mazalov. Birkhauser.
Phelan, C. (2006): “Public Trust and Government Betrayal,” Journal of Economic Theory,
130, 27–43.
Schmidt, K. M. (1993a): “Commitment Through Incomplete Information in a Simple Re-
peated Bargaining Game,” Journal of Economic Theory, 60, 114–139.
(1993b): “Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games of Con-
flicting Interests,” Econometrica, 61(2), 325–351.
Selten, R. (1975): “Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in
Extensive Games,” International Journal of Game Theory, 4, 25–55.
Wiseman, T. (2008): “Reputation and Impermanent types,” Games and Economic Behavior,
62(1), 190–210.
48
